

JOURNAL OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES

Ivan L. Rudnytsky: The Political Thought of Soviet Ukrainian Dissent

Ostap Tarnawsky: Dissident Poets in Ukraine

Євген Пизюр: Конституційна програма і теорія
М. Драгоманова

Jaroslav Petryshyn: Canadian Perceptions of the Ukrainians,
1891-1914

George A. Perfекcy: Mazepa's Speech to His Countrymen

Reviews

11
FALL 1981

ЖУРНАЛ
УКРАЇНОЗНАВЧИХ СТУДІЙ

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

University of Toronto

MARCO CARYNNYK
NADIA DIAKUN

VIVIAN OLENDER
ROMAN SENKUS, *Managing Editor*

FACULTY ADVISOR: Professor GEORGE S. N. LUCKYJ

EDITORIAL BOARD: J. Marko Bojcun, *York University* • Yury Boshyk, *University of Toronto* • Konstantin Huytan, *University of London* • Oleh Ilnytzkyj, *Harvard University* • Bohdan Krawchenko, *University of Alberta* • George Liber, *Columbia University* • Andrij Makuch, *University of Alberta* • Bohdan Mytrowytsch, *Université de Paris* • Professor Peter J. Potichnyj, *McMaster University* • Professor Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *University of Alberta* • Professor Orest H. T. Rudzik, *University of Toronto* • Professor Roman Serbyn, *Université du Québec à Montréal* • Myroslav Shkandrij, *University of Calgary* • Professor Danylo H. Struk, *University of Toronto*.

The *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (formerly *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies*) is published semiannually, in the spring and fall, by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. Annual subscription rates are \$8.00 for individuals and \$10.00 for libraries and institutions. Cheques and money orders are payable in Canadian or American funds only to Journal of Ukrainian Studies. Please do not send cash. Subscribers outside Canada: please pay in U.S. funds.

The *Journal* publishes articles on Ukrainian-related subjects in the humanities and social sciences. The criterion for acceptance of submissions is their scholarly contribution to the field of Ukrainian studies. The *Journal* also publishes translations, documents, information, book reviews, letters and journalistic articles of a problem-oriented, controversial nature. Those wishing to submit manuscripts should observe the guidelines on the inside back cover.

Manuscripts, books for review, and all correspondence regarding subscriptions, changes of address, and editorial matters should be sent to: *Journal of Ukrainian Studies, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, M5S 1A1*.

© 1981 by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

Typesetting by Harmony Printing Limited, Toronto, Canada.

Printed by the University of Toronto Press.

ISSN 0228-1635

Articles

Ivan L. Rudnytsky: The Political Thought of Soviet Ukrainian Dissent	3
Ostap Tarnawsky: Dissident Poets in Ukraine	17
Євген Пизюр: Конституційна програма і теорія М. Драгоманова	28
Jaroslav Petryshyn: Canadian Perceptions of the North-West and the East Europeans, 1891-1914: The Case of the Ukrainians	43
George A. Perfecky: Mazepa's Speech to His Countrymen ..	66

Book Reviews

Alexander J. Motyl. <i>The Turn to the Right:</i> <i>The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian</i> <i>Nationalism, 1919-1929</i> (J. Marko Bojcun)	73
Joseph T. Fuhrmann. <i>Tsar Alexis, His Reign and His Russia</i> (Orest Subtelny)	76
Walter Dushnyk, ed. <i>Ukraine in a Changing World</i> (Alexander J. Motyl)	77
Edward Allworth, ed. <i>Ethnic Russia in the USSR:</i> <i>The Dilemma of Dominance</i> (Peter J. Potichnyj)	78
Myroslava Stefaniuk and Fred E. Dohrs. <i>Ukrainians of Detroit</i> (Ihor V. Zielyk)	80
A. A. Бурячок і І. І. Гурин. <i>Словник українських рим</i> (Ігор Качуровський)	84
Books Received	90

Journal

Contributors

GEORGE A. PERFECKY is an associate professor of linguistics in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures at La Salle College, Philadelphia.

JAROSLAV PETRYSHYN is an instructor of history at Grande Prairie Regional College in Alberta. He is writing a three-volume history of Ukrainians in Canada for the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

IEVHEN PYZIUR (1917-80) was a professor of political science at St. Louis University. He was the author of articles on Ukrainian and Russian social and political thought and of the monograph *The Doctrine of Anarchism of Michael A. Bakunin*.

IVAN RUDNYTSKY is a professor of East-European and Ukrainian history at the University of Alberta. He is the author of many articles and the editor of several books on Ukrainian history, the most recent being *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, which was published by the CIUS this year.

OSTAP TARNAWSKY is a writer, poet and journalist living in Philadelphia. He is currently the head of Slovo, the Ukrainian Writers' Association in Exile.

Журнал

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF SOVIET UKRAINIAN DISSENT*

The movement of intellectual-political dissent, which surfaced in Ukraine in the 1960s, has evoked much interest among foreign students of Soviet affairs. Western scholars, however, have paid little attention so far to the content of the ideas formulated by Ukrainian dissidents. How is this omission to be accounted for? After half a century of massive and relentless repression, the very fact of a vocal opposition movement emerging in Ukraine appeared almost miraculous. Something of this amazement still lingers on today. Most Western analysts have been satisfied with registering instances of Ukrainian dissent, but have been slow in scrutinizing the dissidents' pronouncements as documents of political thought.¹

This neglect is regrettable, because an ideologically oriented study of the Ukrainian dissidents is by no means merely a theoretical exercise. Ideas *do* have consequences. Under the conditions of an imposed conformity, heterodox ideas act as catalysts to forces of change. The statements of the dissidents may serve as an indication of the currents stirring in the depths of Ukrainian society, and they point to the direction in which Ukraine is likely to move should the iron lid of repression become loosened.

* Paper presented at the Thirteenth National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 20-23 September 1981, Pacific Grove, California.

¹ A bibliographical guide to documents and writings of the Ukrainian dissidents and to Western studies on that subject is George Liber and Anna Mostovych, comp., *Nonconformity and Dissent in the Ukrainian SSR, 1955-1975: An Annotated Bibliography* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978). Two English-language anthologies of Ukrainian dissident documents and literature are: Vyacheslav Chornovil, comp., *The Chornovil Papers* (New York, Toronto and London, 1968); and Michael Browne, ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine* (New York and Washington, 1971). These three publications do not cover the more recent expressions of Ukrainian dissent.

Journal

The approach I propose is to place the dissidents' ideas in a historical perspective by relating them to older trends in Ukrainian socio-political thought. Within the scope of this paper, it will be necessary to limit the discussion to a few of the most important topics and representative cases.

In an article published in 1963, I surveyed the Soviet Ukrainian scene; this was before the existence of the emerging dissident movement became known in the West. In noticing the many instances of the post-Stalin cultural revival in Ukraine, I concluded by making two predictions. The first prediction was: "It is possible to foresee that if this process of reconstruction and expansion is going to continue for another few years, it is bound to enter into a phase when it shall assume the form of political demands." The second prediction was: "These [political] postulates will, in all likelihood, follow a 'national-communist' line—not, of course, because communist ideas, as such, are close to the hearts of the Ukrainian people, but because a policy must proceed from certain given data. Under Soviet conditions, a realistic point of departure for Ukrainian politics is the existence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a body nominally endowed with the rights of a sovereign state"²

Indeed, the first outstanding programmatic document of Ukrainian dissent was Ivan Dziuba's treatise, *Internationalism or Russification?*, written in 1965, only two years after the above prognosis had been made.³ As an American reviewer, Professor John A. Armstrong, noted, "the book constitutes a massive, expert work of research scholarship . . . While . . . it appears established that Dziuba wrote the manuscript, it also seems probable that he developed it (perhaps over many years) through exchange of information and ideas with other intellectuals in the Soviet Ukraine. If this last hypothesis is correct, it indicates an extremely sophisticated and erudite opposition to Soviet policy among Ukrainian intellectuals."⁴

For our inquiry, the significant aspect of Dziuba's treatise is the fact that it is written from a Marxist-Leninist position. Dziuba denounced the deviations in Soviet nationality policy in Ukraine

² "Ukraina v evoliutsii radianskoi systemy" (1963), in Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, *Mizh istoriieiu i politykoiu* (Munich, 1973), p. 305.

³ Ivan Dzyuba [Dziuba], *Internationalism or Russification? : A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem* (London, 1968).

⁴ John A. Armstrong's review of Dziuba's book in *Slavic Review* 28, no. 3 (September 1969), p. 504.

from true Leninist principles and called for the restoration of these principles. The work is addressed to Petro Shelest and Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, who at the time were, respectively, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. The book's last chapter bears the programmatic title "The Government of the Ukrainian SSR as the Spokesman of National Integrity: Its Responsibility for the Nation."

It is, therefore, legitimate to evaluate Dziuba as a new incarnation of the "national" communist trend, which in the 1920s played a prominent role in Ukrainian political life not only in the Ukrainian SSR, but also in Western Ukraine (then under Polish rule) and in the Ukrainian diaspora. But we must take notice of one important difference between the original Ukrainian "national" communism of the 1920s and its recent revival by Dziuba. The former was inspired by a genuine revolutionary fervor, by a utopian faith in an imminent worldwide social upheaval and transformation of mankind, or—to use Mykola Khvylovych's poetic image—a vision of the "commune beyond the hills" (*zahirna komuna*). No trace of this revolutionary chiliasm is to be found in Dziuba, whose strictly rational deductions resemble a legal brief. Without questioning the sincerity of Dziuba's Marxist-Leninist convictions, there is no doubt that the intellectual and emotional strength of his work lies entirely in its patriotic appeal, and not in the lengthy quotations from Lenin's writings and Party resolutions.

Under pressure, Dziuba retracted his heresies in 1973 after some vacillation.⁵ He is the only prominent Ukrainian dissident (discounting some minor and marginal figures) to have capitulated to the regime. His recantation has been a bitter disappointment to his numerous admirers both in Ukraine and abroad. Still, it is important to fathom his motives. A plausible interpretation has been advanced by Mykhajlo Savaryn.⁶ Let me elaborate his argument in my own terms: Dziuba was a mouthpiece for that segment of the Soviet Ukrainian establishment that, during Petro Shelest's tenure as First Secretary of the CPU (1963-72), was pushing for the extension of the autonomy of the Ukrainian republic and for increased Ukrainian cultural rights. Dziuba's demands were a theoretical extrapolation of what certain Soviet Ukrainian leaders

⁵ Dziuba's recantation appeared in *Literaturna Ukraina*, 9 November 1973.

⁶ Mykhajlo Savaryn, "Why Capitulate?: Ivan Dziuba's Trauma," *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* 2, no. 2 (Fall 1977), pp. 54-61.

were doing in practice during the era of the “revival of controlled Ukrainian autonomism.”⁷ These circles possibly encouraged Dziuba; they certainly tolerated him and, for several years, shielded him from extreme penalties. Thus, Dziuba’s opposition was fully an opposition within the framework of the system. After the purge of Shelest and his coterie in 1972, this stance became untenable. It lost its political *raison d'être*, and this accounts for Dziuba’s capitulation.

While Ivan Dziuba may be considered a continuator of the “national” communist trend in Ukrainian political thought, another prominent dissident, Valentyn Moroz, is a lineal descendant of the integral nationalist movement, represented by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), that flourished in the western-Ukrainian lands in the 1930s.⁸ Moroz could not overtly advertise his allegiance to integral nationalism in his *samvydav* writings, but perspicacious readers had little difficulty in detecting the sources of his inspiration; certain passages in Moroz sound like paraphrases of Dmytro Dontsov, the ideologist of Ukrainian integral nationalism. What connected Moroz with the Dontsovian-OUN tradition was his philosophical voluntarism, his insistence on the maintenance of the pure national ideal at all costs, his scornful rejection of any pragmatic accommodation to existing conditions, his cult of the strong, heroic, self-sacrificing individual, and, finally, his anti-intellectualism and advocacy of *oderzhymist*, which means approximately “frenzy” or “holy madness.”

Within a society paralyzed by fear, Moroz’s defiant call was bound to have a profound emotional impact. Leonid Pliushch has compared Moroz’s essay, “Amid the Snows,” with Vissarion Belinsky’s celebrated open letter to Gogol. In 1847, Belinsky castigated Gogol’s spiritual subservience to the reactionary regime of Nicholas I; similarly, Moroz pilloried Dziuba for his capitulation to the KGB. It is to be kept in mind that Pliushch represented within the dissident movement a tendency opposed to that of Moroz. Nevertheless, he paid Moroz the following well-earned tribute: “There appeared a new letter of Belinsky to Gogol—and

⁷ Jaroslaw Pelenski, “Shelest and His Period in Soviet Ukraine (1963-1972): A Revival of Controlled Ukrainian Autonomism,” in Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., *Ukraine in the Seventies* (Oakville, Ont., 1975), pp. 283-305.

⁸ The writings of Moroz are available in two parallel English editions: *Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz*, ed. Yaroslav Bihun (Baltimore, Paris and Toronto, 1974); and *Report from the Beria Reserve*, ed. and trans. John Kolasky (Toronto, 1974).

one a thousand times more terrible to Gogol-Dziuba, a thousand times more convincing and soul-inspiring. This was Valentyn Moroz's 'Amid the Snows.' By merging the logic of facts and ideas with the passion of a fighter against any concessions to the KGB, Moroz proved that Dziuba has delivered a blow to his own ideas and to the Ukrainian opposition movement"⁹ This testimony must not be forgotten, especially in view of later events that have tarnished Moroz's image.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that of all the dissidents it was precisely Moroz who became the favorite of the Ukrainian diaspora. Right-wing émigré circles correctly perceived his affinity with their own ideology. Ukrainian student groups in North America, although they had largely become detached from OUN-type nationalism, also idolized Moroz. This cult of Moroz fulfilled the young people's psychological need for hero worship. Spearheaded by student activists, Ukrainians in Western countries mounted a large-scale "release Moroz" campaign. But the Ukrainian diaspora failed to realize that Moroz's views were by no means representative of the mainstream of Soviet Ukrainian dissent. Furthermore, it displayed no awareness of Moroz's serious personal failings. Several prominent dissidents of proven integrity, who had unpleasant encounters with Moroz in Soviet prisons and labor camps, transmitted to the West warnings about his egotism, arrogance and caddishness. But these messages were not publicized in time.¹⁰

The aftermath is common knowledge. Released to the West in April 1979 as part of a Soviet-American exchange of political prisoners for Soviet spies, Moroz was given a hero's welcome by the entire Ukrainian diaspora. Very soon, however, he created universal dismay by his bizarre and scandalous behavior. Politically, he at first allied himself with the most reactionary and obscurantist émigré faction, the so-called World Ukrainian Liberation Front, but soon fell out even with them. Furthermore, since his expatriation Moroz's writings and public pronouncements have displayed an abysmal intellectual vacuity.

⁹ Leonid Pliushch's afterword to the French edition of Dziuba's work, *Internationalisme ou Russification?* (Montreal and Paris, 1980). The quotation is from the Ukrainian version, "Trahediia Ivana Dziuby," *Dzialoh*, no. 1 (Spring 1977), p. 56.

¹⁰ See the excerpts from the letters of Viacheslav Chornovil, Mykhailo Osadchy, Iryna Kalynets and Zynovii Antoniuk in "The Valentyn Moroz Saga: A Conspiracy of Silence," *Student*, no. 61 (February 1980), p. 11.

Thus, two prominent Ukrainian dissidents, Ivan Dziuba and Valentyn Moroz, each proceeding along his own tragic route, have come to a dead end. Their failure cannot be ascribed simply to personal frailties; it is rather of a broader symptomatic significance. Dziuba and Moroz represented within Ukrainian dissent a revival of two powerful currents—"national" communism and integral nationalism—that dominated the Ukrainian political scene during the interwar era. Dziuba's and Moroz's disgrace illustrates the bankruptcy of these two currents in modern Ukrainian political thought.

Although standing at opposite poles and fiercely hostile to each other, Ukrainian communism and integral nationalism have shared many common characteristics. They both have extolled revolutionary violence and the dictatorship of a single party, acting in the name of the masses; both have been illiberal and have rejected civil rights, a pluralistic ordering of the body politic, the rule of law, and Western-type representative government; both have been motivated by an exclusive ideology and a Manichean vision of society, with all the psychological hallmarks of a militant, quasi-religious secular faith. A historian will have no difficulty in identifying them as the Ukrainian variants of the two great, worldwide totalitarian movements of the twentieth century, communism and fascism. This is not the place to discuss the origins and development of Ukrainian communism and integral nationalism (fascism). Let it be said, however, that I acknowledge the indigenous character of both trends in Ukraine, and that I do not deny that in the past they have made some positive contributions to their nation. But I also think that both totalitarian trends were essentially historical aberrations and that they were leading the Ukrainian people into cul-de-sacs. The experience of Stalinism, on the one hand, and of the Nazi occupation during World War Two, on the other hand, exploded the foundations on which Ukrainian "national" communism and integral nationalism were built.

Still, it was in the nature of things that the unfreezing of Ukrainian political thought in the 1960s brought forth these throwbacks to the prevalent ideologies of the interwar period. The lesson to be learned from the fall of Dziuba and Moroz is that "national" communism and integral nationalism have ceased to be, philosophically and politically, viable alternatives for the Ukrainian people, in search of a better future.

The mainstream of Ukrainian dissent has been represented by the *samvydav* journal *Ukrainian Herald* (*Ukrainskyi visnyk*),

eight issues of which appeared between 1970 and 1974,¹¹ and the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords (in simpler terms, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group), which was formed in 1976.¹² The difference between these two exponents of the Ukrainian opposition is that the *Ukrainian Herald* was an underground publication, with anonymous or pseudonymous editors and contributors, whereas the Ukrainian Helsinki Group acted overtly. But there are reasons to assume that the *Ukrainian Herald* originated within the same circle to which the founders and members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group belonged. In terms of ideas, there is an evident continuity between the *Herald* and the subsequent documents of the Helsinki Group.

In trying to define the political philosophy of contemporary Ukrainian dissent, a quotation from the memoirs of its veteran, Danylo Shumuk, may serve as a suitable introduction:

Only democracy can save mankind from the dangers of the rightist as well as of the leftist brands of tyranny. Only the unrestricted right, guaranteed by law, for all citizens to express, advertise and defend their ideas will enable the people to control and direct the policy of the government. Without such a right, there can be no talk of democracy and of democratic elections to a parliament. Where there is no legal opposition, endowed with equal rights in the parliament and among the people, there is no democracy Where an opposition does not exist, there can be no control over governmental policy I have reached these conclusions after many years of thinking, stocktaking and analysis, and they have led me ... to adopt a critical attitude to both communists and Dontsovian nationalists.¹³

Shumuk, a man of the older generation (born in 1914), has himself passed through a communist and an integral-nationalist

¹¹ *Ukrainskyi visnyk* was reprinted by Smoloskyp Publishers in several volumes between 1971 and 1975. Available in English are the sixth issue, as *Dissent in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Herald*, Issue 6, trans. and ed. Lesya Jones and Bohdan Yasen (Baltimore and Toronto, 1977), and the final, double, issue, as *Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R.: The Ukrainian Herald*, Issue 7-8, trans. and ed. Olena Saciuk and Bohdan Yasen (Baltimore, Paris and Toronto, 1979).

¹² Lesya Verba and Bohdan Yasen, eds., *The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine: Documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, 1976-1980* (Baltimore, Washington and Toronto, 1980).

¹³ Danylo Shumuk, *Za skhidnim obriiem* (Paris and Baltimore, 1974), pp. 423-4.

Journal

stage. He was a member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine in pre-war Polish Volhynia, and he joined the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the period of the German occupation. Most of his life has been spent in Polish and Soviet prisons. He declared his adherence to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in 1979, while in a Soviet labor camp. His dearly won democratic convictions are also those of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group as a whole.

The platform of the contemporary Ukrainian resistance can, therefore, be fairly described as democratic patriotism. (I would say "nationalism," if that term had not become ambiguous because of its fascist connotations.) Its most characteristic feature is the linking of the struggle against national oppression with the struggle for democratic human rights. This signifies a return, in a rejuvenated form, to the noblest traditions of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ukrainian liberation movement, whose basic orientation was democratic and humanist, as well as a return to the tradition of the independent, democratic Ukrainian state of 1917-20. This does not imply a total rejection of the achievements of Ukrainian communism and integral nationalism, but rather their sublimation, cleansed from totalitarian perversions. For instance, the dissidents have shown the greatest respect for the heroic struggle of the wartime Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which was a creation of the OUN, while rejecting the latter's addiction to dictatorship and single-party rule.

Ukrainian dissidents have formulated as their immediate objective the implementation in their country of the civil liberties contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki, August 1975).¹⁴ Their long-range goal is "decolonization" of the USSR through free elections, to be conducted in Ukraine under the supervision of the United Nations.¹⁵ In contrast to the "national" communists, contemporary Ukrainian dissidents do not oppose a "good" Lenin to a "bad" Stalin. They assert that Lenin's hypocritical policy toward Ukraine

¹⁴ "Declaration of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords," dated 9 November 1976, in *The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine*, pp. 19-22.

¹⁵ *Ethnocide of the Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R.*, p. 160. See also a recent document, "Decolonization of the USSR Is the Only Guarantee of World Peace," dated January 1980, in *Documents of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement 1980*, supplement to *The Herald of Repression in Ukraine*, 7 (New York, 1980), pp. 3-8.

was in essence identical with the Soviet armed interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which also were disguised as "brotherly help" to the respective peoples.¹⁶ "The Ukrainian people did not want to follow the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917 and demonstrated a strong will to build their own state."¹⁷

In contradistinction to the xenophobic nationalism of the OUN, the ardent patriotism of contemporary Ukrainian dissent does not imply hostility to other peoples, even the Russians. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group has maintained friendly cooperation with the Moscow Helsinki Group and democratic Russian dissidents. Petro Grigorenko (Hryhorenko), a former Soviet Army major-general and a founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, has become internationally renowned by his defence of the national rights of the Crimean Tatars. The 1980 programmatic declaration of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement, the most recent offshoot of the Ukrainian opposition, states:

... freedom for Ukraine will bring freedom for the Russian and other nations enslaved by the existing regime. A free Ukraine guarantees all rights to all peoples living in Ukraine: Russians and Poles, Jews and Tatars, Rumanians and Hungarians. We understand what it means to live under colonial oppression and therefore proclaim: the people who live in our country will be assured the broadest political, economic and social rights. All the rights of national minorities and various religious associations will be guaranteed unconditionally.¹⁸

Another significant aspect of the Ukrainian dissidents' thinking is its legalistic coloring. In fact, Ukrainian dissent is known under the self-chosen name of the "movement for the defence of right" (*pravozakhysnyi rukh*). One might be inclined to view this as merely a tactical device, an attempt to take shelter under the nominal civil liberties that the Soviet constitution and laws grant to citizens on paper. Without denying that such tactical considerations also play some role, one can be sure that the manifest legalism of the Ukrainian dissidents is for them a matter of principle. All of their writings and pronouncements are permeated by the idea of a rule of law. This is a novel phenomenon in the history of Ukrainian political thought. The pre-Revolutionary Ukrainian national movement was undoubtedly libertarian, but

¹⁶ *Ethnocide of the Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R.*, pp. 48-9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

¹⁸ *Documents of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement*, p. 7.

because of its populist orientation, its legalistic sense was under-developed. (Mykhailo Drahomanov, with his strong interest in constitutional problems, was an exception, and in this respect he made no school.) It seems that a long experience with a regime based on lawlessness and the perversion of legality has imbued contemporary Ukrainian freedom fighters with the conviction that liberty can exist only under a rule of law.¹⁹ Thus, while they are intellectual rebels in regard to the present system, they are at the same time also partisans of law and order. I would not hesitate to call this a conservative strand—in the positive meaning of the term—in the ideology of Ukrainian dissent.

One should note certain philosophical divergences within Ukrainian dissent. On the one hand, Leonid Pliushch and Iurii Badzo profess an allegiance to humanist democratic Marxism.²⁰ (I personally think that “democratic Marxism” is a contradiction in terms. Because of this, I view Pliushch’s and Badzo’s profession of Marxism as a symptom of intellectual confusion. This complex problem would require a separate discussion.) On the other hand, there are symptoms of a religious revival among segments of the contemporary Ukrainian intellectual elite.²¹ The poems of Mykola Rudenko, the leader of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, reveal his newly rediscovered Christian faith.²² Another founding member of the group, Oles Berdnyk, has been influenced by Teilhard de Chardin’s evolutionary spiritualism. These differences in world view do not detract from the unity of political commitment to the double goals of pluralistic democracy and national independence. It is fitting to round off this brief survey of the ideas of the Ukrainian opposition by quoting two of its recent programmatic documents:

¹⁹ This concept is expressed with particular strength in “A Manifesto of the Ukrainian Human Rights Movement 1977,” *The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine*, pp. 117-35, written by Oles Berdnyk on behalf of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

²⁰ Leonid Plyushch [Pliushch], *History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography* (New York and London, 1977), esp. p. 377; Iurii Badzo, *Vidkrytyi lyst do Prezydii Verkhovnoi Rady URSR ta Tsentralnoho Komitetu KPRS* (New York, 1980).

²¹ Alexandra Chernenko, “The Birth of a New Spiritual Awareness,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 16, no. 1 (March 1974), pp. 73-88.

²² Mykola Rudenko, *Prozrinnia* (Toronto and Baltimore, 1978). Cf. Alexandra Chernenko’s review in *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 22, no. 2 (June 1980), pp. 309-11.

My social position is socialist, my political position is democratic. I formulate it as a concept of democratic socialism.... [There ought to be] ideological, cultural and political pluralism. The working class and the peasantry should have separate class representations in the organs of state power. There should be a freedom under law to establish democratic parties.... Only then will the Party be a party, and not the dominant stratum in society.²³

The so-called Government of Ukraine has now been implementing a policy of national genocide for sixty years.... For this reason, we, the victims of political repression in Ukraine, proclaim to our nation, to the governments of all the countries of the world, and to the United Nations our desire to secede from the USSR, to lead our people out of Communist slavery.²⁴

In trying to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian dissent, it is helpful to compare it with its Russian counterpart. Russian dissidents are divided into several irreconcilable factions, and the communist reformers, Western-type liberals, and neo-Slavophiles do not speak politically the same language. In contrast, the Ukrainian opposition appears much more united. The common denominator of all Ukrainian dissidents is, undoubtedly, the national factor. One can also assume that Ukrainian dissent possesses a much stronger potential popular appeal than Russian dissent. In Russia, patriotism or nationalism works basically in favor of the present regime, which has elevated the Russian state to a pinnacle of power and prestige. Russian popular nationalism is likely to become divorced from the Soviet regime only in the event of serious setbacks internationally. In Ukraine, which suffers from manifest national discrimination and oppression, patriotic sentiment tends to be spontaneously oriented against the status quo. This gives Ukrainian dissent a powerful potential constituency. The regime is well aware of this danger, and this explains why it has been more ruthless in the persecution of the Ukrainian than of the Russian dissidents.

An area in which Ukrainian dissent is markedly inferior to the Russian is intellectual sophistication.²⁵ We do not find among Ukrainian dissidents such world-renowned figures as Solzhenitsyn

²³ Badzo, *Vidkrytyi lyst*, pp. 24-5.

²⁴ *Documents of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement 1980*, p. 6.

²⁵ The intellectual shortcomings of the Ukrainian dissidents have been discussed by John-Paul Himka in his "Leonid Plyushch: The Ukrainian Marxist Resurgent," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 5, no. 2 (Fall 1980), pp. 61-79.

and Sakharov. On the average, the intellectual level and range of the Ukrainian dissidents' writings is comparatively lower and narrower, despite some very respectable individual achievements, such as the works of Ivan Dziuba, Helii Snehirov, Mykhailo Osadchy, Leonid Pliushch, Iurii Badzo, Vasyl Lisovy, and a few others. This state of affairs reflects the general provincialism of contemporary Ukraine's cultural life: the lack of contacts with the outside world, the insufficient knowledge of foreign languages, and the limited access to non-Soviet books. Furthermore, because of continual purges, directed primarily against elite elements of Ukrainian society, present-day Ukraine's intelligentsia is sociologically very young and hence culturally immature. In examining the family backgrounds of Ukrainian dissidents, one finds in most cases that they are first-generation intellectuals. This causes a cultural handicap that even gifted individuals find difficult to overcome.

Mykola Rudenko's *Economic Monologues* may serve as an illustration of the preceding remarks.²⁶ Rudenko is perhaps the archetypical Ukrainian dissident: a coal miner's son from the Donets Basin region, a Communist Party member since his youth, a decorated veteran of the Soviet army and a war invalid; later a popular novelist, editor of the Kiev literary monthly *Dnipro*, secretary of the Party organization of the Writers' Union of Ukraine; and finally, a member of the Soviet chapter of Amnesty International and leader of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, condemned in 1977 to a term of seven years of imprisonment and five years of post-prison exile. The first part of Rudenko's book is a moving autobiographical account of the quest that turned him from an establishment man into a dissident. The second part is a critique of Marxist economics, and it reads as if it were written by an intellectual Robinson Crusoe. For instance, Rudenko comments on Marx's value theory without the slightest awareness that the topic has been discussed by economists for the past hundred years and that this debate has generated a mountain of scholarly literature. One wonders about the reasons for this embarrassing ignorance. A different impression is created by the book's conclusion, where Rudenko suggests practical remedies for the Soviet Union's economic impasse. He proposes a return to the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s, that is, the restoration of market relations and the unleashing of private initiative. These sound recommendations derive not from Rudenko's naive

²⁶ Mykola Rudenko, *Ekonomichni monolohy* (New York and Munich, 1978).

theorizing, but from his personal observations and common sense. They have been endorsed by the author of the book's preface, a fellow member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Petro Grigorenko.

Let us ask, in conclusion, what the chances are of Ukrainian dissent being transformed from a movement of ideas (composing and circulating *samvydav* literature, writing letters of protest to authorities, engaging in "subversive" talk and correspondence) into an actual political force. Here we leave the realm of the past and the present, which can be studied empirically. Historians are reluctant to prognosticate because they are conscious of the large part the contingent plays in human affairs. Still, one can venture some cautious predictions while guarding against wishful thinking.

The exact number of Ukrainian dissidents is unknown, but in any case, it is microscopic in proportion to Ukraine's population of fifty million. Bohdan Krawchenko has compiled a list of 975 individuals known to have taken part in dissident activities in the Ukrainian SSR between 1960 and 1972.²⁷ The Ukrainian Helsinki compensated by the persistence of dissent, which continues to assert itself against tremendous odds, and by the fact that in the movement various occupational groups and all geographical sections of Ukraine, from Transcarpathia to the Donets Basin and from Kharkiv to Odessa, are represented. As noted above, we have the right to assume that the potential constituency of the Ukrainian opposition is vast. But these potential forces are immobilized by a system in which outlets for autonomous civic action do not exist, communications among individuals are restricted to a minimum, and the entire society is kept in check by fear and universal surveillance; whoever steps out of line exposes himself to swift retribution.

To break this deadlock, the first impulse would probably have to come from the outside, for instance, in the form of a divisive power struggle within the Kremlin oligarchy or a major setback for the Soviet Union in its relations with other socialist-bloc countries. The second step would have to be the creation of an organizational structure capable of channelling the now atomized forces of popular discontent. It seems likely that such a structure would not consist initially of a political party, but, rather, of as-

²⁷ Bohdan Krawchenko, "Social Mobilization and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine," unpublished manuscript, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton. Group had thirty-seven members.²⁸ The tiny numbers are com-

²⁸ Biographical data on all members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group can be found in *The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine*, pp. 251-65.

Journal

sociations representing the social interests of various strata of society. Some tentative moves in this direction have already occurred. Thus, in 1977, the Donets Basin miner Vladimir Klebanov organized an independent trade union that, prior to its suppression, had a membership of several hundred workers.²⁹ In November 1980, an imprisoned Kiev worker, Mykola Pohyba, circulated an open letter calling for the formation of free trade unions based on the Polish model.³⁰ Circumstances permitting, such tendencies could easily escalate, because in the Soviet Union there exist widespread socio-economic grievances, which in Ukraine and other non-Russian republics are compounded by national frustrations.

While it is impossible to predict when and how these potentialities could become actualities, the testimonial significance of the Ukrainian dissidents is beyond doubt. The sacrifice of these courageous men and women bears witness to the unbroken spirit of the Ukrainian nation. Their struggle for human and national rights conforms with the tendency of mankind's progress in the spirit of freedom. The Ukrainian dissidents have faith that the truth of freedom will prevail. It would be shameful for those whose good fortune it is to live in free countries to be of lesser faith.

²⁹ Victor Haynes and Olga Semyonova, eds., *Workers Against the Gulag: The New Opposition in the Soviet Union* (London, 1979).

³⁰ Pohyba's letter has been reprinted in *Ukrainskyi robitnyk*, no. 1 (New York and Munich, 1981). It has appeared also in several Ukrainian newspapers in the West and in English in *The Ukrainian Weekly* (Jersey City), 7 June 1981.

Ostap Tarnawsky

DISSIDENT POETS IN UKRAINE

In the development of Soviet Ukrainian literature, according to the periodization proposed by Ivan Koshelivets,¹ the *shestydesiatnyky* constitute the fourth generation of writers. The first generation, represented by Pavlo Tychyna and Maksym Rylsky—two poets who built the foundation for the entire Ukrainian literary renaissance, was fortunate enough to have the opportunity to express itself. The second generation—Iurii Ianovsky, Leonid Pervomaisky, Mykola Bazhan and others—did not have this opportunity, because the significant period of their creativity coincided with the official dismemberment of Ukrainian literature. The third generation surfaced, as Koshelivets remarks, only after the renaissance man of the 1920s, the artist who was characterized by a spirit of individual creative sovereignty, had been completely destroyed. The regime fortified its literary concentration camp by statutory decrees regarding literary organizations and artistic approach. All literary groups, which had been formed along aesthetic or stylistic lines, were liquidated. Soon afterward, the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of 23 May 1932 forced all writers into a Union of Soviet Writers controlled by the Party. The first congress of Soviet writers, held in Moscow in 1934, proclaimed socialist realism as the only creative approach. Although the regime pointed to the works of Maxim Gorky, the “father of socialist realism,” as the model, the principles adopted by this congress were actually formulated at Stalin’s behest by Andrei Zhdanov, who, until his death in 1949, remained Stalin’s official guardian of Soviet literature.

With this Party noose around the writers’ necks, a new artistic attitude could not develop unexpectedly. Changes would have to occur before any new spirit could emerge. These changes became possible during the so-called “Thaw” (*vidlyha*), a period

¹ Ivan Koshelivets, *Suchasna literatura v URSR* (New York, 1964).

named after the Russian writer Ilia Erenburg's novel *Ottepel* of 1954, which marked a measure of liberalization induced and controlled by the Party. This period began in 1956 with the "historic" Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in Moscow, where Nikita Khrushchev made his famous denunciation of Stalin and the cult of the personality. The Soviet Ukrainian encyclopedia of 1964 describes this event in the following manner:

М. С. Хрущову належить величезна заслуга перед КПРС і міжнародним комуністичним рухом у викритті чужого марксизмові-ленінізмові культу особи, подоланні його наслідків і у відновленні ленінських норм партійного життя та принципів партійного і державного керівництва, в подоланні суб'єктивізму в економіці і політиці та догматизму в теорії. З ім'ям М. С. Хрущова зв'язані повне відновлення соціалістичної законності і дальший розвиток радянської демократії в усіх галузях життя. З його ініціативи були реабілітовані незаконно засуджені в період культу особи видатні діячі... а також ряд визначних діячів науки і культури, зокрема українських.²

Not all important figures were, however, rehabilitated. Mykola Khvylov, for example, is still banned from Soviet literature. Other writers were only partly rehabilitated. Their works were "reedited" and some of their works were intentionally not republished.

The official Soviet history of Ukrainian literature, published during the Thaw, treats this subject very diplomatically:

Повернення народові художньої і наукової спадщини ряду письменників і літературознавців істотно поширило уявлення сучасників про творчі багатства української радянської літератури, про різноманітність її традицій — і це з самого боку сприяло пожвавленню сучасного художнього процесу. До лав працівників української літератури повернулись В. Гжицький, В. Мисик, З. Тулуб, Б. Антоненко-Давидович, Д. Гордієнко, О. Ковінька, П. Колесник, Є. Шабліовський, М. Годованець. Почалось видання і наукове опрацювання таких письменників, як Василь Еллан-Блакитний, Василь Чумак, Мирослав Ірchan, Микола Куліш, Іван Кулик, Іван Микитенко, Євген Плужник, Григорій Косинка, Олекса Слісаренко, Микола Зеров, Олесь Досвітній, Олекса Влизько, Пилип Капельгородський, Валеріян Поліщук, Іван Кириленко, Григорій Елік та інші.³

² *Ukrainska radianska entsyklopediia*, vol. 15 (Kiev, 1964) : 556.

³ Ie. P. Kyryliuk et al, eds. *Istoriia ukrainskoї literatury v vosmym tomakh*, vol. 8 (Kiev, 1971) : 22.

After this “historic” congress Ukrainian literature experienced a creative awakening with the influx of many new young writers and poets. Almost immediately, the official Soviet critics remarked that the works of many writers of the Thaw, especially of the younger ones, were tinged with formalist tendencies and experimental searchings for a new aesthetic. They also noted that these writers promoted a new and sceptical hero and a patriotic attachment to the past, to national roots. They accused these writers of “straying onto the paths of national exclusiveness and abandoning class criteria in their presentation of characters and events.”⁴ Furthermore, the critics stated, “foreign critics from the enemy camp have demagogically proclaimed the younger generation, the ‘grandchildren,’ to be the sole transmitters of the artistic process, relegating all of the older ‘fathers’ and ‘grandfathers’ to the ranks of the barren traditionalists.”⁵

But these foreign critics understood the significance of the liberalization in Ukrainian literature without exaggerating it into a profound and lasting change. Koshelivets states precisely that

Ці полегші були незначні і непевні, механізм терору діяв за інерцією далі, а все ж і цього було досить, щоб радянська людина, зокрема українська, виявилася живою і здібною до духового відродження, і до національного також. Оживання охопило цілий літературний процес, але для спостережника, тим більше з віддалі, воно інкарнувалося в окремих постатях, які більше і сміливіше від інших стали речниками нового духу в літературі — я сказав би — духу гуманізації.⁶

Leading these courageous spokesman, according to Koshelivets, was Maksym Rylsky. Rylsky was highly regarded not only by the nationally conscious and patriotic intelligentsia in Ukraine but also by the émigré community. (It is generally known how highly he was valued by the émigré poet Evhen Malaniuk.) According to Koshelivets, Rylsky personified the conscience of the Ukrainian people. Rylsky wholeheartedly welcomed the new spirit of humanism in the literature of the Thaw and the young writers who entered the literary arena as the *sheshtydesiatnyky* (the generation of the 1960s). Although he was officially praised and awarded with many prizes and titles, Rylsky understood that in the conditions he had been fated to live and write, he could not express all of his creative potential. But he hoped that his work would lay

⁴ Ibid., p. 26.

⁵ Ibid., p. 27.

⁶ Koshelivets, op. cit., pp. 249-50.

Journal

the groundwork for a new rebirth. In one of his last poems, Rylsky expressed this hope:

Може я запишу останні
сторінки у зошиті своїм —
а десь близько, в білій тиші ранній
хлопчення із чубчиком льняним,
тільки що навчившись говорити,
підбира, ласкає і сердите,
перші пари непокірних рим....
... Не мого він зошита допише, —
свій почне новим своїм пером.⁷

The new poets Rylsky alludes to came forward, as George Luckyj states, with new aesthetic ideals, not unlike those of their predecessors of the 1920s:

Yet when they came to the forefront of Ukrainian literature, the men and women of the sixties (*shestydesiatnyky*), who were mostly poets, were not nationalist. To be sure, some of their works—and especially their achievements in revitalizing and enriching the Ukrainian poetic language—appealed to national sentiments. Yet the main impact of the “young poets” in Ukraine, just as it was in the 1920s, was made on universal, esthetic grounds. To say that their protest is expressed in human rather than national terms simply because the latter are still taboo is to misunderstand the nature of modern Ukrainian literature. Like every other literature, it no longer wants to be concerned merely with national politics but with the human condition. In this it follows the finest traditions of Ukrainian literature from Shevchenko onwards.⁸

Vasyl Symonenko, one of the earliest *shestydesiatnyky*, might have become this new poet in the Shevchenko tradition.⁹ He expressed the pain and hate of the people who experienced the Stalinist terror:

⁷ Maksym Rylsky, “Nashchadok,” *Poezii* (Kiev, 1950), p. 175.

⁸ George S. N. Luckyj, “Introduction,” in Ievhen Sverstiuk, *Clandestine Essays*, trans. and ed. George S. N. Luckyj (Littleton, Col. and Cambridge, Mass., 1976), p. 8.

⁹ Vasyl Symonenko was not the first of the *shestydesiatnyky*. Even before the publication of his first collection of poetry, *Tysha i hrim*, in 1962, Lina Kostenko had published three collections (*Prominnia zemli* [1957], *Vitryla* [1958], and *Mandrivka sertsia* [1961]); Ivan Drach had published his *Nizh u sotsi* (1961) and *Soniashnyk* (1962); Vitalii Korotych had published his *Zoloti ruky* (1962); and Mykola Vinhranovsky had published his *Atomni preliudy* (1962).

Уже народ — одна суцільна рана,
уже від крові хижіє земля,
і кожного катюгу і тирана
уже чекає зсукана петля.¹⁰

This was written, as Koshelivets underlines, by a young person raised under communism, with a Party card in his pocket. Because of this Symonenko was deemed reliable by the literary officials. He was introduced to the readers by none other than the academician, professor, doctor of philology and poet Stepan Kryzhanivsky, who wrote that the essence of Symonenko's poetry is found "in its humanist tonality . . . and, in contrast to the excesses of the cult of the personality, in its heightened attention to and love for the common man."¹¹

The expression "humanist tonality" was further elaborated officially as follows:

Ця "гуманістична тональність" означає активність художнього пошуку в тих життєвих сферах, де утверджується і торжествує гармонія особистих і суспільних інтересів, яку забезпечує соціалізм. Поет живої пристрасті й душевного горяння, Симоненко органічно не сприймав абстрактних побудов і схолястики. Найвища віра в справедливість і людяність нашого суспільства зумовляла його нетерпимість до явищ, що суперечать принципам соціалістичного співжиття. Він не міг бути байдужим, коли бачив хоч одну скривджену душу, нездійснену надію, і писав про це гостро, безкомпромісно, застерігаючи, однак, від нігілістичного критиканства і демагогії: "Правди в брехні не розмішуй, не ганьби все під ряд без пуття" ("Найогидніші очі порожні") . . . В. Симоненко був послідовним борцем за людину високих моральних принципів. В його поезії чітко виражена ідея торжества комуністичної моральності як необхідної передумови загального духовного прогресу суспільства. Він ненавидів егоїстичну обмеженість і фальш, духовну ницість і корисливість.¹²

If we disregard the confusion of communism with morality (for morality is a branch of ethics that deals with the human conscience, while communism is a politico-economic theory), then we can accept this evaluation of Symonenko's role as a poet, par-

¹⁰ Vasyl Symonenko, "Granitni obelisky, iak meduzy...", *Bereh chekan* (New York, 1965), p. 137.

¹¹ Stepan Kryzhanivsky, "Radist pershovidkryttia," in Vasyl Symonenko, *Tysha i hrim* (Kiev, 1962), p. 152. See also *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury*, 8: 311.

¹² *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury*, 8: 311-2.

Journal

ticularly in its observation of Symonenko's contempt for the hypocrisy that prevailed in Soviet socialism realism. In the climate of an officially imposed aesthetic, this spark of humanity seemed like the flame in one of the poems of Lina Kostenko, the pioneer of the *shestydesiatnyky*:

... ліхтарник
сходить із свого велосипеда
і впускає вогненну пташку
у скляну клітку ліхтаря.¹³

Vitalii Korotych expressed this sentiment even more directly:

Я за чисте мистецтво,
а мистецтво чисте тоді,
коли роблять його
і руками і думками чистими.¹⁴

Thus, the young poets protested against the hypocrisy that had dominated Ukrainian literature for so many years and had not disappeared even after the cult of the personality had been denounced. This hypocrisy was evident in the policy of selectively rehabilitating writers and their works. It was evident also in the reaction to the new poets. There were friendly responses, to be sure, most notably those of Maksym Rylsky, but there were also denunciations and overt threats. Pavlo Tychyna, who had greeted the freedom of his nation in the time of the revolution, now took the position of the defender of the status quo and showed no sympathy for the new humanism. Official critics tried to fit it into a literary framework under Party control. This can be seen in the official history of Ukrainian literature. On one hand, for example, it praised Lina Kostenko, chiefly for her poem "Mandrivka sertsia," because "the work's thematic concern also reflects the spiritual-humanistic searches of literature in its new stage."¹⁵ On the other hand, it tried to convert the poet's defense of the new man and his right to be himself into an official paradigm of literature as a servant of the state: "the principal motif in [Kostenko's] poem is the passionate call for the vitalization of the human spirit, for brotherhood and unification in the struggle against contemporary reaction."¹⁶

¹³ Lina Kostenko, "Likharnyk," *Mandrivky sertsia* (Kiev, 1961), p. 59.

¹⁴ Vitalii Korotych, "Chyste mystetstvo," *Poezii* (Kiev, 1967), p. 111.

¹⁵ *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury*, 8: 299.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 300.

Obviously, it did not mean Soviet reaction, even if this was what Kostenko meant. Moreover, it stated that “some of Kostenko’s poems published in periodicals elicited well-founded accusations from the critics inasmuch as there were discernible expressions of ideological confusion and of a one-sided, pessimistic view of the world in these works.”¹⁷

This hypocrisy was even more evident in the official attitude towards Vasyl Symonenko. It applied the same methods as those used in political rehabilitation, namely, distortion and omission. This was possible because Symonenko had already died, having lived only twenty-eight years, without seeing the publication of his second collection of poetry. Thus, despite the fact that the official history devotes an unusual amount of space to Symonenko and even contains a large picture of him, his literary portrait is incomplete. The poems that exemplify his “humanist tonality” are not discussed.

The poems excluded from Symonenko’s second collection *Zemne tiazhinnia*, published posthumously in Kiev in 1964, such as “Zlodii,” “Samotnist,” “Brama,” “Kurds’komu bratovi,” “Ia,” “Sud” and “Ukrainskyi lev,” were circulated in private copies throughout Ukraine and eventually found their way to the West. They were the first examples of the underground literature that has become the backbone of dissent.

All of the *shestydesiatnyky* wrote unofficially. Even established poets, such as Tychyna, did. Symonenko died just before the Party decided to put an end to this *svobodomysliie* (free thinking). The Party’s attack began with Khrushchev’s speech on the occasion of the exhibit of Moscow painters in 1962. By 1965, those who supported and implemented the resolution of the second congress of Soviet writers of 1954 on the creation of an atmosphere tolerating creative individualism were being persecuted, and later even arrested and imprisoned. Works with a “humanist tonality” disappeared from the pages of official publications.

However, not all writers surrendered to the Party. The ideas expressed at the twentieth congress had not been forgotten. They reverberated in the critical thinking of the intelligentsia, which sought explanations, information, and a freer atmosphere that would prevent the recurrence of Stalinism. To avoid official censorship, which once again lowered its tyrannical heel on the printed word, the new humanists resorted to underground publications.

¹⁷ Ibid.

Journal

They copied material by hand or on accessible duplicating machines, and circulated it through the *samvydav* network.

One of these new humanists was Ivan Svitlychny. Even before the appearance of the *shestydesiatnyky*, Svitlychny had entered the scholarly world as an associate of the Ukrainian academy of sciences and the author of the essay collection *Bahatstvo zhyttia i odnomannitnist motyviv* (Kiev, 1956). In 1960, a collection of his poetry, *Ridnyi korin*, was published. Early in 1965, Svitlychny was tried and sentenced for transmitting Symonenko's poems and diary to the West. In 1972, together with other poets and writers, he was again sentenced, this time to seven years of imprisonment and five years of exile.

In Svitlychny we can observe how the spark of the new ideal of compassion and humanism, which received its impetus from the official Thaw, captured the hearts and minds of the young writers and gave them the strength to speak freely and openly, to condemn the hypocrisy of socialist realism. Like Symonenko, Svitlychny raised his voice in protest, demanding not only the freedom of expression but also the right of his people to be free, to resist "the oppression of Russian chauvinism, whose audacity and insidiousness is unheard-of in history."¹⁸

For Svitlychny the role of the poet is not limited to the creation of new literary values. The poet, particularly when his nation is faced with extinction, has a civic responsibility as a member of a nation. Svitlychny shows us how he understands this role in his poem "Rylski oktavy."¹⁹ The poem was written under the influence of Rylsky, who had, in general, a great impact on the young poets in Ukraine. It echoes Rylsky's poem "Chumaky," which Rylsky dedicated to his father Tadei, a well-known Ukrainian populist. The first two lines of Svitlychny's and Rylsky's poems are identical. They reflect the "sweet world" (as the critics M. Dolenko and M. Zerov called it) of Rylsky's poetic imagination: "V povitri doshch i hrechka pakhne teplo,/ nemov rozlyvsia burshtynovy med . . ."²⁰

Here, however, the similarity ends, for Svitlychny's poem is a firm and sharp condemnation of Rylsky for his acquiescence to Stalin's terror, for singing "sweet odes" to a quiet and remote poetic paradise when his responsibility to his nation obligated

¹⁸ Ivan Koshelivets, "U khoroshyi Shevchenkiv slid stupaiuchy," in Vasyl Symonenko, *Bereh chekan* (New York, 1965), p. 59.

¹⁹ Ivan Svitlychny, "Rylski oktavy," *Suchasnist*, 1978, no. 10, pp. 3-6.

²⁰ M. Rylsky, "Chumaky," *Vybrane z tvoriv* (Munich, 1965), p. 78.

him to protest, as did, later on, the young poets Ihor Kalynets and Vasyl Stus.

For Svitlychny the line of demarcation is precise and clear. In this dark age, the poet's role, as Svitlychny sees it, is quite different from that played by Rylsky. Like Kalynets and Stus, the poet should not compromise with the oppressive regime, as did Vitalii Korotych and Ivan Drach, nor escape into silence, as Lina Kostenko attempted to do. Kalynets and Stus were persecuted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment merely for their desire for free poetic expression. Their decision to write in the tradition of Shevchenko, directing their gaze to the distant past and dedicating themselves to beauty in its national form, accompanied their desire to serve their nation. Their feelings were expressed by Kalynets: "Like every prisoner, I long with all my heart for freedom, but realizing quite soberly the present oppressive situation in Ukraine, I prefer the camp."²¹

Another, more outstanding figure among the dissident poets, Mykola Rudenko, is not a product of the fourth literary generation. He belongs to the third generation, which did not participate in the rebirth of the 1920s. Its members often did not know about it, since all traces of it had been officially erased. Only the Thaw and the beginning of a new literary discussion opened his eyes and the eyes of his generation to the hypocrisy and criminal policies of the regime that led to the destruction of Ukrainian culture and its writers. Rudenko eventually came to see himself as a victim of this crime and spoke out against it.

During the Thaw, Rudenko tried to make a serious appraisal of his literary work. After having served the regime for so many years, he came to the realization that the path he was following was not the one leading to truth. Rudenko did just what Svitlychny expected Rylsky to do, but in a different period and in different circumstances. In Rudenko, as in Symonenko, we hear echoes of Shevchenko's "word," dedicated to serving the nation in its struggle against enslavement and to its national rebirth:

Я не помру, я обізвуся в людях,
щоб розбудити помисли незлі,
бо слово те, що пломеніє в грудях,
до них проб'ється навіть з під землі.²²

²¹ Quoted in George S. N. Luckyj, op. cit., p. 15.

²² Mykola Rudenko, "Na Baikovim ne slid mene khovaty . . .," *Prozrinnia* (Baltimore, 1978), p. 199.

Journal

These lines echo Shevchenko's famous "I na storozhi kolo ikh/postavliu slovo."

In Rudenko we can see the crystallization of the idea of the defense of human values through the defense of human rights. Thus, Rudenko accepted the responsibility of forming and heading the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, thereby applying his philosophy and poetic faith to a political platform. Here again we see an imitation of Shevchenko, who was also an active member of a political organization, the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Like Kalynets and Stus, Rudenko, even though he was a high-ranking official in the Writers' Union of Ukraine and had been decorated for his literary and military services, was arrested and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment.

Not only did the *shestydesiatnyky* draw great inspiration from Shevchenko; they also established a cult of Shevchenko, with annual pilgrimages to his monument in Kaniv. In one of Lina Kostenko's early poems, Shevchenko's statue speaks the following words to the assembled youth:

Ви гартуйте ваші голоси,
не пустослів'ям пишним і барвистим,
не скаргами,
не белькотом надій,
не криком,
не переспівом на місці,
а заспівом в дорозі нелегкій.²³

But were these poets really singing in the face of adversity? Rylsky, whose death coincided with the dawn of a new poetry and the onset of official repression, heralded the advent of a new poet who, without continuing Rylsky's lines, would speak with his own voice. The Thaw offered this possibility, but only for a short time and only through the deliberate choice of the Party. The propaganda machine, which not only controls literary life but actually plans it, lost no time in appropriating the words of Symonenko and his contemporaries. It proclaimed a new definition and interpretation of humanism. Those who had the courage to defend their views with arguments developed during the Thaw were soon being persecuted. The hypocrisy that the young poets had fought with such enthusiasm returned in full force through the channel of official literary life. Humanism was not rejected;

²³ Lina Kostenko, "Kobzariu, znaiesh . . .," *Mandrivky sertsia* (Kiev, 1961), p. 5.

it was merely altered by the dialectical tailors, using the mannequin of socialist realism to prepare one uniform for all. Thus, new studies of Shevchenko appeared in which his humanism was presented from the perspective of socialist realism.²⁴

It is therefore hardly surprising that the young writers, imbued with an ardor worthy of a better cause, directed their energies toward protest against the official pseudo-humanism, or, more correctly, anti-humanism, to the inevitable and unfortunate detriment of their literary development and creativity. Mastery of form and universality of theme were all too readily sacrificed for the political soapbox and "the good of the cause."

The protesting voice of Mykola Rudenko was particularly shrill because he realized his own previous complicity in the official dogmatism. With the fervor of a neophyte he labored to regain the lost time. Ivan Svitlychny, who had learned his poetic craft in Rylsky's workshop, attacked his mentor in the boundless exuberance of his protest. Yet Rylsky was one of the few who managed to preserve their dignity during the terror. His mere existence was a silent protest against the attacks on Ukrainian culture.

The spark of humanism had ignited the well-soaked wick but cast no light beyond the confines of the lantern. Light did not radiate beyond the glass prison; the poetic word stumbled on in obscurity.

If one were to ask whether the poets of the sixties began a new period in Ukrainian literature, the question would have to remain unanswered. The commissars of literature muffled the young and independent voices. They applied the tried and true methods of centralized control. Those poets who succumbed could never again push their works beyond the established confines of socialist realism. Those who had the courage not to surrender were repressed.

Thus, Rylsky must be considered to have been in error when, having taken a breath of fresh air, he spoke of a poet who would not have to continue his poetry, the poetry of the terror, but would begin his own in an untrammeled voice. However, this short period of creative attempts, though suppressed by the Party, testifies to the vitality of Ukrainian literature and its potential to contribute to the humanistic tradition.

²⁴ Ievhen Shabliovsky's *Humanizm Shevchenka i nasha suchasnist* (Kiev, 1964) is one example.

Євген Пизюр

КОНСТИТУЦІЙНА ПРОГРАМА І ТЕОРІЯ
М. ДРАГОМАНОВА *

На початку березня 1812 року, коли армії Наполеона наближались до Росії, Олександер I покликав до себе Якова де Санглена, шефа тайної поліції, та сказав йому таке: „Я вдоволений вами і в доказ мого довір'я до вас я скажу вам таке: я питав Сперанського, чи взяти мені особисто активну участь у проводі війни, що наближається. А він став сміло вихвалюти мілітарні таланти Наполеона, опісля порадив мені скликати Думу Боярів, поручити їй провід війни, а коли йдеться про мене, держатись остононь. Що він собі думає? Хіба ж я ніщо? А тепер я бачу виразно, що він хотів знищити самодержавство, яке я обов'язаний передати непохитно своїм нащадкам”.¹

Майже ціле століття пізніше, в 1904 році, коли хвилі революції почали щораз то більше заливати імперію, царський двір доручив графові Вітте вести переговори з визначними громадськими діячами, щоб покористуватись їх порадою у шуканні виходу з критичної ситуації. Коли в час однієї такої конференції Іван Петрункевич відмітив, що тільки надання конституції може втихомирити бурю революції, Вітте відповів: „Ви не берете до уваги, що наш цар дивиться на самодержавство як на догму закону, як на повірену йому заповідь, якої ні в цілості ні в частині він не може нікому передати. Така його віра, і ви безсильні її змінити”.²

* Друга в циклі стаття-передрук з історії української духовності. Стаття з'явилася уперше в журналі “Листи до приятелів”, ч. 160-161-162, кн. 8-9-10 (1966).

¹ J. I. de Sanglen, *Memoiren von Jakob Iwanovitsch de Sanglen, 1776-1831* (Stuttgart, 1894), стор. 241.

² П. Н. Мілюков, *Воспоминання* (Нью-Йорк, 1955), том I, стор. 241.

Ці дві периферійні, самі по собі мініатюрні, події можуть нас скоро і легко ввести в центральну проблему російської модерної державності, а саме потребу усунення автократії та заступлення її конституційною системою правління. Це правда, що саме в дев'ятнадцятому столітті, зокрема в його другій половині, в Росії відбулися основні соціальні зміни і реформи; усунено панщину, прийшов процес модернізації адміністрації за допомогою земства, наступив розвиток економіки, теж культури взагалі. Але, не зважаючи на це, всі ті досягнення залишились завішеними в повітрі, поки політичний режим імперії, тобто самодержавство, не було заступлене репрезентативно-конституційною системою. Базою консолідації поступу була перебудова політичної системи. Як довго самодержавство залишалось ненадщербленим, закріплення всіх досягнень ставало неможливим. Це, зрештою, дозвела більшовицька революція, яка змітаючи самодержавство, знищила теж великою мірою всі ті надбання, що їх Росія досягла в дев'ятнадцятому столітті і опісля.

Російська політична думка дев'ятнадцятого століття здавала собі дуже ясно справу, що тогочасна суспільно-політична дійсність була не до вдержання та що російська імперія мусіла б основно змінити свій дотеперішній курс. Іншої думки були лише офіційні славослови самодержавства. Решта політичних мислителів спішила з порадою і плянами докорінних змін. Слов'янофіли наївно рекомендували повернути в до-петрівську „святу Русь”. Радикально-революційна течія — головно в її народницькому виданні — повірила, що Росія має всі передумови перескочити т. зв. буржуазний лад і парламентарну систему та прямо опинитись в раю аграрного, безклясового і бездержавного порядку. Була ще третя, позбавлена прикмет утопізму, течія в російській імперській політичній думці: конституційна. Але ця, хоч заманіfestувалась чітко, із-за багатьох причин мала найслабший відгомін і найменше впливу.

Конституційна думка і рух мали кілька етапів розвитку в Росії. Перша фаза була пов'язана з добою Олександра I і конспірацією декабристів. Вона стояла в тіні традицій і досягнень французької революції. Тридцятилітній деспотизм Миколи I положив їм кінець так, що коли з настанням „великих реформ” прийшло нове широке і спонтанне зародження конституційних ідей і руху — вони не могли на'язати до конституційних традицій часів Олександра I. Шістдесяті роки принесли буйне захоплення конституційними ідеалами та видали чергу замітних теоретиків. Один із них, Борис Чіче-

рін, напевно дорівнює, якщо не перевосстає, наймаркантніших представників конституційної теорії того часу на Заході. В шістдесятих роках передові круги російської суспільності були переконані, що після соціальних реформ, прихід конституційної монархії ставав неминучим. Вони надіялись, що ініціатива для цього переломового кроку вийде від царя. Але сталося інакше; прийшло польське повстання, опісля поворот в реакцію. Конституційним змаганням шістдесятих років покладено кінець. Правда, усунути цілком конституційний рух стало вже неможливо.

Третя фаза в розвитку конституційного руху прийшла до імперії в 70-х і 80-х рр. Але саме ці роки були кульмінаційним насиленням народництва. Хоча народницький революціонізм виповів самодержавству війну на смерть і життя, — він не був союзником конституційного руху. Навпаки, вінуважав, що конституційна система може принести користь лише дворянству і буржуазії (якої в той час в Росії майже не було) за ціну добра народу. Він поставив усе на одну карту, на карту „соціальної революції”, або, точніше кажучи, на бунт селянських мас. Таким способом народницька ідеологія цілком обезцінила вартість і значення суто політичних реформ, громадських свобод і конституційної системи. І щойно коли революційний терор народників виявив себе неспособним повалити самодержавство, почалась переоцінка ідеологічних позицій та повільний, але все зростаючий вплив конституційних ідей та розгортання конституційних змагань.

В 60-х рр. носієм конституційних ідей і руху було ліберальне дворянство. У 70-х і 80-х рр. до нього долучилась частина інтелігенції. Інтелігенція принесла з собою демократичні, ще частіше, соціалістичні орієнтації і сентименти. Тому конституційна доктрина 60-х років, базована на класичному лібералізмі і дворянському корпоративізмі, вимагала її повного перепрограмування. Можна сказати, що ніхто із політичних мислителів імперії того часу не подолав того завдання повністю. Коли хтось наблизився до тієї цілі найближче — то був ним українець, Михайло Драгоманов. І його заслуги на цьому полі були з вдячністю відмічені передовими російськими конституціоналістами наступного покоління. Павло Мілюков, лідер кадетів, відмітив у своїх спогадах: „Ми оба відразу дійшли до тих самих політичних висновків і мені жаль, що наші зв'язки не продовжувались”.³ Петро Струве,

³ Там же, стор. 148.

один з основоположників „Освобождения” — першої організації російських конституціоналістів — та видавець його органу, після десяток літ нагадував: „Великий вплив на мене і на інших молодих людей мали писання російського українця, Михайла Драгоманова, першого непідкупного і тверезого публіциста серед російської еміграції, який рішуче проповідував принцип боротьби за політичну свободу і демократичні інституції та відкидав ідею соціальної революції за допомогою терористичних засобів”.⁴ Знову ж радянський біограф Драгоманова, Давид Заславський, прямо обвинувачував кадетів, що вони вбачали у Драгоманові свого духовного батька та з насмішками відмічував, що „більш усього повитягали кілків із драгоманівського плota російські ліберали-конституціоналісти”.⁵

**
*

Зрозуміти належно конституційну доктрину Драгоманова можна на тлі цілості його світогляду, як теж подій його життя. Викласти все це в одній короткій статті стає надзвичайно трудно, якщо взагалі можливо, — навіть коли б обмежитись до найбільш основних елементів його світогляду. Але тому, що конституційна доктрина Драгоманова нерозривно пов’язана з рештою його суспільно-політичної думки, поминути цілком оцінку його світогляду теж не можна. Обмежуючись до конечного, тут слід сказати таке: світогляд Драгоманова є синкретичним. Його поодинокі елементи є запозичені з різних ідейних джерел, від різних політичних шкіл чи мислителів. Еклектичні світогляди є звичайно, або бодай дуже часто, повні суперечностей та неорганічно пов’язані. На мій погляд, із світоглядом Драгоманова є інакше. Бо хоча джерела його світогляду є різні, запозичення багаті, — він позбавлений основних суперечностей. Драгоманов досяг цього ціною тонкощів думки і дбайливістю інтерпретації, які нераз близькі до цього, що можна б назвати „софістикацією”. Та саме тому ці нюанси драгоманівської думки такі важливі; вони забезпечують єдність і логічність його світогляду та з черги суцільність його конституційної доктрини. Слід теж згадати, що тут лежить головне джерело для часто невірної інтерпретації ідеології Драгоманова та для посягнень по його полі-

⁴ P. Struve, “My Contacts and Conflicts with Lenin,” *The Slavic and East European Review* 12 (1934) : 580.

⁵ Давид Заславский, М. П. Драгоманов: Критико-биографический очерк (Київ, 1924), стор. 5.

тичну спадщину, що йдуть з різних, нераз навіть протилежних таборів; або сліпе і фанатичне заперечення заслуг Драгоманова як політичного мислителя і діяча.

Після цих вступних завваг, зупинімось коротко на основних принципах світогляду Драгоманова, без розуміння яких схоплення суті його конституційної програми стало б майже загороджене. Основний принцип цього світогляду становить лібералізм. Але з клясичного лібералізму Драгоманов прийняв лише його політичну доктрину, а відкинув соціальну. Політична доктрина клясичного лібералізму клала ввесь на голос на свободу одиниці. Коли ж ішлося про державу, клясичний лібералізм підходив з великим недовір'ям до політичної влади. Його політична рецепта була: чим слабша влада в державі, тим більше є їй політичної свободи. Прагматика політичного життя заперечує такий підхід. Влада і свобода не суперечить одна одній, а доповнюють себе взаємно. Слаба політична влада неспосібна забезпечити успішно громадські свободи та дивиться на них підозріло, а то й ворожо. Повне послаблення влади це передсінок до анархії, а ця остання це заперечення і правопорядку і політичних прав узагалі. Відповідний баланс політичної влади і громадських свобод творить політичну систему стабільною і здорововою, де люди можуть жити добре і достойно. Драгоманов прийняв беззастережно політичну теорію клясичного лібералізму, яка редукувала владу — як голосила тоді модна фраза — до „нічного сторожа проти правопорушників”. В додаток, таку негативну поставу Драгоманова до влади посилював вплив на нього політичної, хоча не соціальної, доктрини народництва, що в своїх крайніх маніфестаціях скочувалась до повного заперечення політичної влади і держави, тобто приймала засновки автентичного політичного анархізму. Тут теж головна причина слабостей політичного світогляду Драгоманова, з черги теж його конституційної доктрини. Таку помилку Драгоманова можна легко пояснити. Він був виходцем із російської держави, де влада поневолила все. Тому помилка зрозуміла, але це не усуває недомагань його доктрини.

Коли ж ішлося про решту суспільно-політичної програми Драгоманова, то він рішуче і далеко вийшов поза рамки клясичного лібералізму, який бодай підсвідомо бажав припинити соціально-політичний процес на межі еманципації середніх класів, визволивши їх із оков абсолютної монархії. Драгоманов бачив дуже ясно, що проголошення принципу правої рівності кожної людини мусить логічно і неминуче довести лібералізм до демократії, тобто до участі народних мас

у політичному житті держави. Врешті він правильно оцінив, що політична емансидація працюючих мас мусить іти впарі із соціально-економічним визволенням, та що в довершенні останньої рішаючу роль відограють соціалістичні ідеї і соціалістичний рух. Тому він визначив себе самого рішуче як соціаліста.

Але підпорядкувати соціалістичні погляди і переконання Драгоманова під будь-яку існуючу течію чи школу соціалізму було б дуже важко. Від російського соціалізму народницького типу відділяла його майже пропасть. Йому була чужа містична віра в досконалість мужицьких мас та в „містику народного бунту”. В додаток Драгоманов рішуче засуджував піднесення терору до ролі універсального політичного інструменту. Не менше відштовхував його теж марксизм із своїм аподиктичним економічним детермінізмом та візією апокаліптичної пролетарської революції. Драгоманівська версія соціалізму була виразно методою досягнення конкретних соціальних здобутків для покращання долі працюючих мас, а не кодексом соціально-світоглядових догм. У схемі його соціалізму не було широких воріт, через які можна було б гучно і святково в'їхати одного дня до соціалістичного раю, не було місця для есхатології безклясового і бездержавного царства на землі. Його соціалізм був програмою і методою для ступневого піднесення господарського, громадського, освітнього і морального рівня народних мас; його соціалізм був безперервною подорожжю в цьому напрямку без чіткого відмічення кінцевої станції.

Врешті ще один основний елемент світогляду Драгоманова: його погляд та програма щодо розв'язки національного питання. Проблема т. зв. національного самовизначення, а з тим і націоналізму, виринула із зростанням сил лібералізму та демократії після заломання легітимістичного принципу традиційних монархій. Політична думка дев'ятнадцятого століття дала три основні відповіді на національне питання. Одна із них виводилась з філософії Гегеля. Вона бачила в т. зв. неісторичних народах поганій для великих націй, яким була призначена роль носіїв цивілізації. Друга відповідь прийшла від марксизму. Марксизм, станувши на платформі абсолютноного пролетарського солідаризму і інтернаціоналізму, замкнув собі дорогу до теоретичної розв'язки цього питання, а в своїх проголошеннях до конкретних ситуацій не відходив далеко від гегеліянських концепцій: тобто, що бездержавні народи є полем для цивілізаційних походів і підбоїв історичних націй — цього разу в ім'я соціалістичних ідеалів. Врешті

третя відповідь, яка назрівала довго, була найбільш чітко визначена німецьким політичним вченим Блюнчлі. Вона проголошуvalа: „Скільки народів, стільки держав — скільки держав, стільки народів”.⁶ Розпрацювали і розповсюдили такий погляд Мацціні, фон Моль, Манціні та мадяр Етвеш.

Очевидно, що Драгоманов приєднався до третьої пропозиції; але він поставив цілу низку застережень. Всі вони, більш-менш, зводились до того, що абсолютне застосування принципу національного самовизначення приведе до небувалого зросту виключних і агресивних націоналізмів усіх націй, не лише панівних, але й колишніх поневолених. Драгоманов передбачав, що ці нетолерантні націоналізми майже повно задушать ідеали лібералізму, тобто громадсько-політичні свободи та гідність одиниці-людини. І тому він бачив у слушній і вдалій розв'язці національного питання „бути чи не бути” лібералізмові. Він пропонував розв'язку цього питання по лінії федерацівного принципу, пристосованого без хитрощів, щиро і великудушно. Лібералізм, з черги демократизм, знехтував цей принцип і тому прийшло те, чого боявся Драгоманов. В ім’я обожествленої нації прийшли поневолення і нівелляція суспільностей та людини.

Такі були основи світогляду Драгоманова, коли спровадити їх до елементів, що їх зредукувати далі ледве чи можливо. На такому світогляді виростала його конституційна доктрина та політична програма для перебудови ладу російської імперії.

Основою конституціоналізму є признання примату політичної категорії. Або іншими словами: конституційна доктрина виходить із засновків, що політика, політична система, є завершенням і рамками для суспільного життя. Не економіка чи суспільні кляси творять рамки і форму для політики, а навпаки: остаточне русло для громадського життя створює держава з її політичним устроєм та напрямком політики. Очевидно, конституційна доктрина не нехтує суспільними силами, ані не заперечує тісного пов’язання поміж соціально-економічною та політичною структурами даної суспільності. Вона не каже, що кожну бажану політичну систему можна залюбки прищепити будь-якій суспільності. Цього конституційна доктрина не твердить, вона не попадає у протилежну крайність та не проголошує всемогутнім політичний фактор. Вона настоює на тезі, що консолідація соціальних здобутків

⁶ J. K. Bluntschli, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Berlin, 1866), стор. 107.

може остаточно наступити на основі відповідної політичної системи, — а не навпаки. І тому конституціоналізм ставиться до політичних реформ не лише позитивно, але теж і активно. Вони для нього є скоріше самоціллю, а не лише засобом для, наприклад, економічного поступу. У протилежність до економічного чи будь-якого іншого детермінізму, конституціоналізм уважає, що політичні поліпшення і реформи не є автоматичним вислідом змін у господарській чи іншій суспільній сфері. Він не уважає, що поки цих змін немає, зміни і поліпшення політичної системи стають з місця засуджені на невдачу, а то й немислені. Радше навпаки: конституційна думка стойть на становищі, що належні політичні реформи не лише змінюють і консервують суспільні досягнення, але теж їх приспішують. Або ще чіткіше: щойно політичні реформи відкривають двері для дійсного і тривкого поступу у соціально-економічній сфері.

З таких засновок виростає практична програма конституціоналізму. Держава має мати основний закон, тобто конституцію. Ця остання визначає будову і межі компетенцій начальних політичних інституцій держави. У висліді приходить відповідальнє перед суспільністю правління, також обмеження сваволі політичної влади. Наголос спочиває на відповідальності тих, що несуть владу, а не на обмеженні поля діяльності політичної влади. Теж у демократичній, конституційній державі уряд може розпоряджати дуже великим і імпозантним об'ємом влади — але він відповідальний перед громадянством за спосіб її вжиття, чи евентуального наду життя. Політична відповідальність, а не конечно априорне обмеження поля дії уряду, створює основу того, що називається репрезентативно-конституційною системою.

Такі погляди лежали в основі конституційної програми Драгоманова. Тому його політичне „вірую” було, що опозиційні громадські сили російської імперії повинні зосередити всю свою увагу і зусилля на боротьбу за політичну свободу, на змагання спрямовані на усунення самодержавства та заступлення його репрезентативною системою, — а не в першу чергу на спровокування грандіозної народної революції. Досягнення першого, тобто конституційної системи, зробить можливим поступ у долі працюючих мас. Справжнім ворогом поступу є в першу чергу самодержавство як політичний режим, а не уросяна буржуазія чи хоча б навіть дворянство. Тому наперед треба повалити царський режим, або — що є легшим завданням — бодай його зреформувати. Тоді у новій, свободній політичній системі знайдеться підхожий інструмент

для переведення широких суспільно-економічних реформ. Тому наперед повинна прийти боротьба за політичну свободу, а щойно опісля змагання за соціальні блага.

Така постава Драгоманова була небуденним досягненням із його боку, коли взяти до уваги цілість поглядів пануючої неофіційної російської політичної думки. Саме в літах, коли Драгоманов виступив із своєю конституційною програмою, головні напрямки політичної ідеології в імперії досягли вершка в знеціненні примату політичної категорії та в запереченні доцільноти політичних реформ. Корені такої традиції йшли у двох протилежних напрямках. Один, консервативний, мав за своїх духових батьків слов'янофілів. Вони ставили свої політичні висновки переважно на базі західних політичних теорій романтизму, що дивились на суспільність і державу, як на біологічно понятій, живий організм. За поглядом теорії романтизму, суспільність чи держава ростуть своєю закономірністю так, як, наприклад, дерево. Всяке втручання ззовні є безцільне, бо безсильне. Всяка свідомо подумана спроба політичної реформи є намаганням насильно змінити природний ріст. Вона протизаконна і тому засуджена на повну невдачу. Висновок: плекаючи давні і рідні традиції, остається пасивно вичікувати.

Другий корінь цього знецінення політичної категорії за рахунок соціальної, вів до російської радикально-революційної думки. Ця остання, головно під впливом ідей Прудона, за посередництвом Герцена, Бакуніна і Чернишевського, прийняла погляд, що лише соціальні зміни і реформи мають глузд, що політичні реформи самі по собі є не лише безцільні, а часто просто шкідливі, бо вони є обманом мас у користь вищих класів. У 70-х і 80-х рр. ті дві течії російської політичної думки об'єдналися на цьому пункті знецінення політичної категорії. Вони обі заняли цілком негативну поставу до політичних реформ як таких, хоча коли йдеться про політичну програму на будуче, вони виразно розходилися і стояли в опозиції одна до однієї.

Драгоманов рішуче порвав з цією традицією та всю свою енергію присвятив на усвідомлення політичної опінії імперії про важу і значення політичної свободи та доцільність зміни системи правління. І хоча не в одному його політичним учителем був саме Прудон, в цьому титанні він зайняв протилежну позицію. В такім підході лежить безумовно найбільше досягнення Драгоманова як політичного мислителя і діяча. Тут теж лежить вихідний пункт для дальншого розвитку його конституційної програми для Росії.

Як решта лібералів російської імперії, Драгоманов уважав, що історичний процес Росії був у загальному подібний до того, що його пройшла західня Європа. Тому російська імперія повинна звертатись до західного світу за зразками майбутнього політичного і суспільного ладу. Виходячи з таких засновок, Драгоманов піддав рішучій критиці всі теорії, лівого чи правого напрямків, що відмічали особливу історичну, політичну чи суспільну самобутність Росії, що гляділи на історичний процес Росії як безпаралельний і унікальний феномен. І хоч, наприклад, Драгоманов, зберіг через ціле своє життя сентимент і повагу для Герцена, він не міг йому простили його слов'янофільських ухилю та тому теж називав його просто „великомосковським слов'янофілом”. Або інший приклад: хоча Драгоманов уважав себе за соціаліста, він не милосердно картає народників за їх ідею, що Росія признаєна історією досягти перша соціалізму. Така ідея здавалась йому нічим іншим, як новим перелицюванням доктрини „Москва — третій Рим”. Засуджуючи месіяністичні течії Росії, він заключав: „Ми не думаємо, що економічне життя Росії може відхилятись від законів економічного життя країн, що досягли вищого ступня розвитку”.⁷

Також у політичній ділянці Росія повинна піти тим шляхом, що його проробив західній світ; закинути абсолютистичну монархію та прийняти парламентарну, репрезентативну систему. Але Драгоманов ніяк не вірив, що остання може завітати до Росії за почином або допомогою Романових. Тут він рішуче розходився із лібералами 60-х рр. На його думку, конституційне правління може прийти до Росії лише у висліді завзятої і безкомпромісової боротьби поступових сих із самодержавним елементом. Без цього рішучого і послідовного зусилля Росії не досягти конституційного ладу.

Хто ж мав би повести цю боротьбу за повалення самодержавства? Тут Драгоманов опинився віч-на-віч з проблемою, що доводила до розpacії неодного широго ліберала в Росії. Звідкіля повинні прийти сили, що їх завданням мала б бути боротьба за конституцію? Драгоманівська відповідь була: із т. зв. „общества”. Скresлити соціологічно поняття терміну „общество” — нелегко. Та застосовуючи дозволене упрощення, можна сказати, що в основному „общество” складалось з двох, не все чітко розмежованих елементів: лібераль-

⁷ М. П. Драгоманов, Собрание политических сочинений (Париж, 1905-1906), том II, стор. 572.

ного дворянства і професійної інтелігенції. Обі ці соціальні верстви об'єднували освіта та опозиція до самодержавства. Але їх роз'єднував погляд на соціальну програму. Інтелігенція, у своїй подавляючій більшості, прийняла соціалістичні ідеї та мріяла про повне здійснення колективного соціалізму. Ліберальне дворянство видвигало помірковану соціальну програму. Драгоманов був свідомий того, що як довго існує по-між цими двома верствами така далекодіуча різниця в поглядах на соціальну програму, їх вірний союз у боротьбі за конституцію є нездійснений. Хто ж тоді, на його думку, повинен був поступитись: дворянство чи інтелігенція? Його відповідь була: радше інтелігенція. Чому? Бо в країні, де маси непросвічені, політично цілком недосвідчені і навіть примітивні, соціалістичний рух мусить виродитися в конспірацію, кермовану революційною елітою. З черги ця еліта, в таких умовинах, мусить намагатись досягти неподільної влади в новій державі, щоб цим способом мати у своїх руках підхожий інструмент для доосновної соціалістичної перебудови суспільності. Якщо б ій це вдалося здійснити, такий стан, на думку Драгоманова, завершиться т. зв. демократичним цезаризмом, тобто новим виданням самодержавства з іншою соціальною структурою та іншою програмою. Але тоді, як і раніше, для політичної свободи не буде місця. З тих причин інтелігенція повинна закинути ідею поголовної соціалістичної революції (хоча не соціалістичні ідеали) і стати лояльним союзником ліберального дворянства та нарastaючих середніх класів. З цього, соціально двообличного, табору повинні прийти сили для боротьби за конституційну систему в Росії. Вони мусять здати собі справу з одного: у своїм змаганні з самодержавством, їх завзяття, рішучість і готовість на посвята і жертви не сміють бути менші, чим народницького революційного тaborу. Треба одначе оминути одної фатальної похибки революційних кругів, а саме: не підносити політичного терору до рівня і ерзацу політичної програми. Коли б таке мало статись, постане прірва поміж шляхетністю цілей і погубністю засобів.

Врешті ще одна умовина, незвичайно важлива, коли йдеться про структуру організації конституційної партії. На думку Драгоманова, вона не сміла б бути побудована за централістичною схемою. Вона має бути союзом автономних секцій побудованих за національним принципом. Це дуже важливе, просто рішаюче з погляду майбутніх перспектив, бо за оригінальним і слушним поміченням Драгоманова, структура партій чи організацій, що боряться з ворожим режимом, у ви-

падку їх перемоги, стає звичайно основою і схемою побудови нового ладу в державі.

З черги, коротко, останнє питання, що стосується драгоманівської конституційної програми: як мав, на його думку, виглядати майбутній лад у Російській імперії? Тут наперед слід сказати таке: програма Драгоманова рішуче різнилася від проектів 60-х рр. В 60-х рр. конституційна думка клала наголос на центральний, вседержавний парламент. Вона уважала, що з його встановленням буде успішно забезпечена свобода та вкорочена сваволя політичної влади в Росії. I хоча конституціоналісти 60-х рр. надавали великої ваги місцевому самоврядуванню у формі земства, вони дивились на нього в першу чергу як на засіб модернізації адміністративної машини та уважали, що ці дві речі — верховний парламент і місцеве самоуправління — не є безумовно залежні від себе. Політичні права громадян були дискутовані в 60-х рр. радше несистематично і спорадично, а принцип федералізму лише на маргінесі. Спільним знаменником для конституційних ідей 60-х рр. (винятки, очевидно, існували) було позитивне відношення до політичної влади як такої.

Як було сказано раніше, у всіх цих головних пунктах драгоманівська конституційна схема основно різнилась. Шукаючи за безпосередніми причинами цих різниць, треба в першу чергу зупинитись на факті впливу ідей Прудона на політичний світогляд Драгоманова. Як і Прудон, Драгоманов схилявся до погляду, що політична влада є сама по собі скоріше конечним злом ніж позитивним фактором для формування громадського життя. Її з конечною можна і треба толерувати, але її заміри і ходи треба радше все ставити під сумнів. Він поділяв прудонівську думку, що демократизація адміністративної машини держави не є універсальним засобом проти небезпек із сторони політичної влади і тому така демократизація може дуже легко завершитись новим державним абсолютизмом. I тому, на думку їх обох — Прудона і Драгоманова, центральний парламент, навіть коли вибраний загальним голосуванням, не міг стати сам по собі достатньою запорукою збереження політичних і цивільних прав громадян. Він може помогти виконати ці завдання лише тоді, коли буде підмуркований дуже сильно розбудованою, теж складною, системою інституцій місцевого самоуправління.

Принижуючи вартість і значення центрального парламенту, Драгоманов поклав увесь наголос на права одиниці. Ці останні мають і мусять бути збережені за всяку ціну. Як цього досягти? Шукаючи безустанно розв'язки, Драгоманов

прийшов до таких остаточних висновків: треба перебудувати політичні інституції на периферіях державного життя так, щоб вони мали достатню силу протиставитись імперіалізмові центру держави; з черги, треба держати в постійній мобілізації громадсько-політичні сили, що стоять поза рамками державного апарату, щоб вони помагали вкорочувати абсолютизм державної влади.

Що стосується першої проблеми (побудови політичних інституцій), то тут Драгоманов спирається на принцип автономізму і федерацізму. Ціла Російська імперія мала б бути поділена на федеративні одиниці з власною, незвичайно широкою автономією. Тому схема перебудови царської імперії переносила далеко межі того, що називається федерацією та прибрала виразно форму конфедерації, тобто державного союзу, де суверенітет належить радше поодиноким сферами автономічним одиницям, а не спочиває у центральних державних інституціях. У проекті Драгоманова розмежування поодиноких автономічних одиниць, т. зв. областей, не покривалось з етнічними границями індивідуальних національностей. При їх розмежуванні мав бути взятий під увагу історично-економічний регіоналізм. З черги кожна федеративна область мала б бути союзом самоврядувальних одиниць та таким способом представляти собою піраміду самоуправних інституцій. Як законодавчий, так і адміністративний персонал мали б прийти з виборів, довірених усюому повнолітньому населенню. Таким способом мала наступити елімінація всесильної російської бюрократії. Завершенням федеративного устрою мало бути центральне правління, якого серцем повинен був стати федеративний парламент, зложений з двох палат. Цей парламент мав органічно виростати із місцевих соймів поодиноких федеративних одиниць-областей. Драгоманов залишив за центральним урядом так мало влади, його компетенції були до такої міри обмежені з усіх сторін правами нижчих клітин федерації, що у висліді наступала замість розподілу суверенітету держави, її фактична ліквідація. Такий стан позбавляв драгоманівський проект виглядів на здійснення, бо робив його нереальним. Справжня федеративна держава не може дозволити собі на повний параліч влади у центрі.

Таку розв'язку намічав Драгоманов на площині перебудови державних інституцій. З черги його пропозиції відносно того, як здергати імперіалізм центру держави з допомогою сил, що стоять поза рамками державної машини. Тут його ідеї були вповні слушні та належать сьогодні до загально-прийнятих. Драгоманов бачив цілу чергу таких сил, які мог-

ли б і мали б виконати це завдання. Коли йдеться про найважливіші, тут треба згадати такі: передовсім громадянство і поодинокі громадяни мусять досягти повної свідомості ваги і вартості своїх політично-суспільних прав та все бути готові до їх оборони. Без такої свідомості, політичні права, навіть якщо рішуче гарантовані законами, стають заржавілою зброєю в політичному арсеналі. З черги існування різних національностей в рамках одного федерацівного союзу-держави, є чинником, що помагає зберегти політичну свободу. Загрожені у своїх правах та поспішаючи на їх оборону — ці національності оборонять громадські свободи і права для всіх, для цілої суспільності, що живе в одній державі. Існування незалежних церков вивінуваних автономією, що спирається на принципі відділення церкви від держави — це теж фактор, що помагає зберегти та скріпити свободу. Не менш цінною гарантією свободи є незалежна, вільна і політично відповідальна преса.

Драгоманов виклав найбільш детально і систематично свій конституційний проект, подаючи вичерпні коментарі, у „Вільній спілці”. Сам проект конституції має скоріше історичне, ніж практичне значення. Він дав поштовх до низки пізніших проектів конституції для Російської імперії. „Вільна спілка”, яка належить до найбільш відомих політичних творів Драгоманова, дає сумаричне відзеркалення цілості його політичного світогляду, зокрема його конституційних ідей.

**

Підсумовуючи заслуги Драгоманова як ідеолога і захисника конституціоналізму в Росії, треба в першу чергу відмітити ось що: конституційна доктрина Драгоманова не є поズавлена слабих сторінок. Усі її недомагання в загальному можна спровадити до одного джерела: дуже далеко посуненого недовір'я Драгоманова до політичної влади. Але ці недомагання його конституційної теорії і програми є рівноважені цілою чергою позитивних прикмет. Драгоманівські конституційні ідеї, пронизані непідкупною інтелектуальною і моральною чесністю, диктували до себе пошану навіть у їх противників. Їх інша заслуга: ще поки було усунене, чи хоча б вкорочене, самодержавство, до дверей імперії почала стукати, спочатку тихо, опісля щораз голосніше — демократія. Конституційна доктрина Драгоманова врахувала цей факт. З ще більшою чіткістю вона була проектована на національне питання Росії. Без чесної розв'язки національного питання, всякий поступ в напрямку досягнення конституційної системи

ставав майже неможливим у Росії. Немале значення мала теж обстановка, що автором цієї конституційної програми був член інтелігенції, який зasadничо оформив її в рамках тогочасної ідеології російської інтелігенції, але рівночасно вбудував у неї чесно і великудушно аспірації інтереси поступового дворянства. Та найбільшою заслugoю конституційних ідей Драгоманова було те, що він безкомпромісово пригадав громадянству імперії вагу і вартість політичної свободи та виразно і рішуче перестеріг його перед тими небезпеками, що їх несла з собою т. зв. „містика революції”, тобто візія модернізованої пугачовщини, підкріпленої макіявелізмом змовництва.

На рахунок цього Богдан Кістяковський відмітив: „Російські революційні кола були заворожені ідеєю перескоку Росії у соціалістичний лад. З тих причин вони вважали за конечне охоронити народ перед капіталізмом і буржуазією та оба ці явища ідентифікували нерозривно із конституціоналізмом. Тому вони були несвідомі ваги політичної свободи, виявили байдужість, ба навіть ворожість до неї. Такі обставини приневолили [українця] Драгоманова проповідувати всеросійський конституціоналізм... Його послідовне і неухильне настоювання на політичне звільнення Росії зробило з Драгоманова передового представника російської конституційної ідеї”.⁸

⁸ Б. Кістяковський, „М. П. Драгоманов по его письмам”, *Русская Мысль*, 1911, ч. 9 (вересень), стор. 134 і наст.

Jaroslav Petryshyn

CANADIAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE NORTH-WEST AND THE EAST EUROPEANS, 1891-1914: THE CASE OF THE UKRAINIANS*

It is a tautology to state that perception and reality do not always coincide. The year 1981 marks the ninetieth anniversary of the beginnings of Ukrainian immigration and settlement in Canada. During this year of celebration much has been written and said about the successful "Galicians" and "Bukovinians" who trekked to the Canadian North-West not only to till the earth but to mine its resources, build its transportation system and stoke the fires of its industries. Yet, to Canadians who, between 1891 and 1914, witnessed a massive influx of these East-European peasants, their contribution to the Canadian national development was not readily apparent. Indeed, the vast majority displayed apprehension, if not outright hostility.

Just as the Ukrainians came equipped with their own *Weltanschauung*, so, too, Canadians had their own ideals and perception of their destiny. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Canada was imbued with "Imperialist" philosophy. Nowhere was this more evident than in the image of the North-West. New settlers upholding British-Canadian traditions and values, it was envisioned, would flood into the great, unpopulated hinterland and ultimately enable the Dominion to shed its peripheral existence within the Empire and to assume equal partnership with Great Britain.

The ascendancy of such a definition of "Canadian nationality," which reached its zenith at precisely the period mass immigration to the North-West began, sparked a desperate debate vis-à-vis

* This article forms part of a larger study on Ukrainians in Canada sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of those who participated in the study: Luba Dzubak-Petryshyn, David Lupul, Andrij Makuch and Nestor Makuch. The author, of course, accepts responsibility for the article.

Journal

the cultural, social and political suitability of East Europeans in general, and the Ukrainians in particular. The context was an ideal—that of the North-West as a British-Canadian outpost; at stake was the apocalyptic vision of an Anglo-Celtic Canada.

I

In the minds of many Canadians, the North-West was the second “garden of Eden.” Expansionists, promoters, government officials, Canadian Pacific Railway agents, and Canadian Imperialists, captivated by the spectre of the unlimited potential for development in the North-West—natural resources, but especially agriculture—adorned it with magical qualities. A government publication in 1884, for example, described the District of Alberta by quoting Tennyson:

For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see
Saw the vision of the world, and all the wonders that could be
Saw the heavens fill with commerce argosies of magic soils
Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales.¹

Even before Confederation, the North-West was seen as indispensable to Canada. The *Toronto Globe*, in 1862, solemnly declared:

The non-occupation of the North-West Territory is a blot upon our character for enterprise. If Canada acquires this territory it will rise in a few years from a position of a small and weak province to be the greatest colony any country has ever possessed, able to take its place among the Empires of the earth. The wealth of four hundred thousand square miles of territory will flow through our waters and be gathered by our merchants, manufacturers and agriculturists. Our sons will occupy the chief places of this vast territory, we will form its institutions, supply its rules, teach its schools, fill its stores, run its mills, navigate its streams . . .²

As the above quote illustrates, such grandeur for the North-West rested not only on its resource and agricultural potential, but also on the character of the society that was to develop. As one writer noted, “the destiny of a country depends not on its material re-

¹ A. Shortt, “Some Observations on the Great Northwest,” *Queen’s Quarterly* 2, no. 3 (January 1895): 185.

² Cited in R. C. Brown, “For the Purposes of the Dominion: Background Paper on the History of Federal Public Lands Policy to 1930,” in J. G. Nelson, R. C. Scase, R. Kouri, eds., *Canadian Public Land Use in Perspective* (Ottawa, 1973), p. 6.

sources; it depends on the character of its people.”³ An implicit assumption was that “the institutions and social practices of the East were to be transplanted to the North-West... and these in turn would inevitably develop in the North-West to the point of lighting the way to a new and better civilization for all of Canada... a place of renewal and improvement of national institutions.”⁴ Rhetoric from Ontario, for example, saw the prairies as the last economic outpost that would integrate Canada into the British Empire. The basis had already been laid by the transplantation of Ontario institutions to the region. With Manitoba “reborn in the image of Ontario,” the road was now clear “to advance that Anglo-Saxon civilization which seems destined to dominate the world.”⁵ These views, at first promoted by expansionists, such as George Brown and William McDougall, Canadian nationalists, such as Charles Mair, and others of the Canada First Movement, metamorphosed in the 1880s and 1890s into the “Imperialist” concept of the nation’s future.

Imperialism, in the Canadian context, was a sentimental and intellectual movement. Imperialists were those who believed in the inherent superiority of everything British and fervently desired a “closer union of the British Empire through economic and military co-operation and through political changes which would give the dominions influence over imperial policy.”⁶ Their sentiments were expressed well in the following verse:

Shall not we through good or ill
Cleave to one another still?
Britain’s myriad voices call
Sons be welded, each and all
Into an Imperial whole,
One with Britain, heart and soul
One life, one flag, one fleet, one throne.⁷

³ Principal Grant, cited in Norman Patterson, “The Canadian People: A Criticism of Some of their Social Peculiarities,” *Canadian Magazine* 13, no. 2 (June 1899): 135.

⁴ Douglas Robb Owram, “The Great North West: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Image of the West in the Nineteenth Century,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1976), pp. 342, 462.

⁵ S. A. Thompson, “Possibilities of the Great North West,” *Review of Reviews* 8, no. 5 (November 1893): 10.

⁶ Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914* (Toronto, 1973), p. 3.

⁷ Cited in G. Bryce, “The Canadianization of Western Canada,” *Transactions, Royal Society of Canada* (1910), appendix A, p. LVII.

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Imperialists could be plentifully found, filling magazines and newspaper columns with their proselytizing rhetoric. George Denison, George M. Grant, George Parkin, George Wrong, John Willison, Vincent Massey, Arthur J. Glazebrook, Edward Peacock, Sir Edmund Walker, and Sir Joseph Flavelle, a veritable Who's Who of the nation's intellectual, business and political elite, subscribed to and articulated Imperialist ideas. They were followed by others: Stephen Leacock, Andrew Macphail and William Grant, who, in their own indelible styles, contributed to the Imperial concept of Canada. Their prose could be read in such prestigious journals as the *Queen's Quarterly*, *The Round Table*, *University Magazine* and the *London Times*.⁸

The Imperialists were a unique breed. Looking backward to the traditions of the United Empire Loyalists (whose centennial of settlement in Canada was celebrated in 1884)⁹ as the historical basis for their contentions, and to the concomitant "agrarian" way of life as the most principled enterprise, they loudly proclaimed the superiority of Anglo-Saxondom. Perceiving themselves as equals of the Americans and British, they believed that "some of the best blood of the British race flows in our veins; and our system of government, our social organizations and our social habits are of a standard which is scarcely equalled in any country in the world."¹⁰ The concept of one "race" being superior to another had irresistible appeal. Many Imperialists, for instance, preached "social Darwinism," accepting the theories of Sir Francis Galton, who, in 1883, "concluded that the advancement of race and, consequently, society could only be accomplished with the propagation of the fit and the elimination of the unfit."¹¹ Echoing these sentiments, one Canadian commentator wrote:

It is a people's duty to set their face toward a high ideal of national life, to conserve such elements as are in harmony with this ideal, and to eliminate whatever is opposed to it. The higher civilization has a moral right to displace the lower.¹²

⁸ Berger, op. cit., pp. 26, 36, 41, 43.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 79-81.

¹⁰ Patterson, op. cit., p. 135.

¹¹ Terry L. Chapman, "Early Eugenics Movement in Western Canada," *Alberta History* 25, no. 4 (Autumn 1977): 9.

¹² J. R. Conn, "Immigration," *Queen's Quarterly* 8, no. 2 (1900-01): 119.

At a time when theories of racial superiority were popular and acceptable, Imperialists sincerely believed that heredity explained even social flaws: "paupers and criminals are generally such because of inherent defects."¹³ Canada's political and social institutions—its preference for law and order and its capacity for self-government—were equated with the genius of the British nationality and sentiments. They were, the Imperialists believed, a product of the moral, social and political spirit that emanated from the greatest empire the world had ever known.

It was only the presence of Quebec that defied the Imperialists' "desire for a sense of Canadian nationality rooted in the same language, identical traditions and similar racial characteristics."¹⁴ Yet, they considered the French Canadians of small consequence, because the rapid growth of the English-speaking section of the population would, in time, exert total dominance over the Canadian nationality, especially in the North-West.¹⁵ The roots for British civilization had already been laid by the Hudson's Bay Company, which quickly taught the native peoples to respect the British and the North-West Mounted Police (founded in 1873), who preserved not only law and order but the continuation of British institutions in the North-West.¹⁶

While resting their ideals on the country's colonial past, in which the Loyalists retained prominence, Imperialists awaited impatiently the nation's future. Only if Canada became a world power could she rise above colonial status and assume true partnership in the Empire. Unfortunately, during the 1880s and early 1890s, the road to Canada's ultimate destiny seemed blighted. Economic depression, the undermining of agrarian values through rapid industrialization and urbanization, the emergence of nouveau-riche entrepreneurs, who shunned aristocratic traditions, the increasing emigration from Canada to the United States, and the ever-present danger of annexation by the Republic to the south seemed to threaten the very fibre of British North America. The Imperialists thus placed their hopes and aspirations on Canada's hinterland—the North-West.

As yet sparsely populated, the North-West would surely become the home of large numbers of people. The northern climate would quickly weed out all undesirables, leaving only hardy agri-

¹³ Ibid., p. 129.

¹⁴ Berger, op. cit., p. 134.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 152.

¹⁶ Bryce, op. cit., p. XLI.

culturalists to perpetuate the way of life considered by the Imperialists to be characteristic of ideal citizenship. The immigrants to the North-West would come from Ontario, thus stemming the emigration to the United States. From northern Europe would come those possessing a racial capacity for free institutions. When tempered by the climate, they would quickly assimilate to British-Canadian norms. In the context of Imperialist thinking, then, the North-West would become an Imperialist hinterland that, when fully developed, would ensure the destiny of Canada by a continuation of the best that British traditions had to offer. Indeed, with the emergence of their own unadulterated hinterland, the Imperialists would no longer be provincials or colonials, but empire builders.

Given the prevalence of such doctrines, it was not surprising that their adherents reacted negatively when confronted with mass Ukrainian immigration into the North-West. Indeed, belief in racial differentiation underpinned the classification of Eastern and Southern Europeans as a lower form of humanity. An "a priori" assumption had been that immigrants possess or readily acquire the English language and assume British social and political ideals. But was that possible? Could "dirty" Galicians and "backward" Bukovinians be made into acceptable British subjects? Throughout the last decade of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, the issue was hotly debated.

II

Imperialists had no use for non-British immigrants, nor could they justify their presence in Canada. They feared the foreigners not only because they could not be relied upon to uphold Canada's British character, but also because they threatened to destroy the precious links that the Dominion had with the British Empire. A. Hurd, a Canadian journalist, wrote:

The newcomers from America and Europe may make good enough Canadians, but will they become loyal subjects of the British Empire? The two terms are not synonymous.... Will not the present feeble separatist movement gather strength when the time is ripe, when the Dominion has increased in prosperity, and the population has been further swollen by foreign peoples, and particularly Americans, who are never weary of pointing to the progress of the United States as an independent power?¹⁷

¹⁷ Cited in Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, *Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed* (Toronto, 1974), p. 164.

The non-American immigrants were cast as pawns capable of holding the balance of power in the struggle between supporters of Imperial connections and those advocating closer union with the United States.

A great many politicians shared Hurd's Imperialist views. E. G. Prior, for example, Member of Parliament from Victoria, believed that "the aim should be to people Canada with those who have the courage and the wish to build up the British Empire and perpetuate British institutions."¹⁸ Admitting that he had "never been in company with . . . a Galician . . . that I know of, but I have heard a great deal about them," he was, nonetheless, one of their strongest critics in the House of Commons. He emphasized what he thought as the hopelessness of the situation:

How can we expect Canadians to welcome these people? We have nothing in common with them. They cannot assimilate with us in any way, and the settlers around them say they do not wish their young people to have any communication with them whatever. Are such people likely to make good citizens and contribute to building up the British Empire?¹⁹

Prior's criticism was based on his very clear definition of Canada's character and destiny as part of the British Empire.

Prior's sentiments were echoed by an emphatic Canadian press. The *Halifax Herald* outlined Canada's wants thus: "What Canada greatly needs is population—immigrants; not immigrants just of any sort, but immigrants fit for the developing and up building of a British country of great mineral and agricultural resources."²⁰ In an article entitled "British Institutions in Danger," the *Montreal Daily Star* expressed fear that Canada would lose its British character if it continued to promote immigration of "Galician and other foreigners," who are "opposed to British customs, lazy and vicious."²¹ The immenseness of Canada's task in preserving its British character was discussed by Clive Phillips Wolley in the *Ottawa Anglo-Saxon*:

The whole world is at present ringing with rumours of a federation the greatest that the centuries have seen, a federation of the Anglo-Saxons of the world We must build a British race of British

¹⁸ *Canada, House of Commons Debates*, 1899, p. 6837 (hereafter *Commons Debates*).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1899, p. 6842.

²⁰ *Halifax Herald*, 22 April 1899.

²¹ *Montreal Daily Star*, 6 May 1899.

Journal

bricks. You cannot make Anglo-Saxondom of Doukhobors, Galicians, and Finns.... It is or should be the principal object of all good Canadians is [sic] to build up a race which shall hold and develop Canada for the Empire.²²

According to Wolley, Canada was failing in this monumental task. In rhetorical form, he criticized the policy of Clifford Sifton (the Minister of the Interior, 1896-1905):

What do you think of Mr. Sifton's policy, brother Anglo-Saxons? Is it a policy of preference to Great Britain or of discrimination against Britons? Is it a policy which will unite the Empire and her colonies or one which will sow in the greatest of them a seed of division more dangerous to Canada than the Negro element is to the States today?²³

For Imperialists, the only genuinely suitable immigrants were red-blooded Englishmen. The *Morden Chronicle*, for example, used this criterion to assess the Ukrainians:

The Galicians are not approved settlers as they come to us, and there is not yet any assurance that they will eventually assimilate with our people and develop [sic] into Canadian citizens of the high standard that obtains in this Dominion.... The doubt in regard to the Galicians is the fact that they have no kinship with us in blood.²⁴

That racial purity, for many, was necessary to achieve the British world federation could not be doubted. According to Wolley

It is not too much to affirm that in the Anglo-Saxon type, man has reached to the highest point of excellence to which he has hitherto attained and whilst it is our duty to do what we can to bring mankind as a whole up to our level, it is at least fair to ask whether it is wise to spoil THE BEST by reckless admixture of the SCUM.

The dogs may pick up the crumbs which fall from the children's table, but there is no reason why they should be asked to sit at that table, mix blood with and share the heritage of the children.

And that is just what is being done today. Into Manitoba and the Northwest Territories we are pouring Mennonites, Doukhobors, Galicians, Finns and heaven knows what besides.

Why? They are not of our race....²⁵

²² *Ottawa Anglo-Saxon*, 9 June 1899.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ *Morden Chronicle*, 25 May 1899.

²⁵ *Ottawa Anglo-Saxon*, 9 June 1899.

Vitriol displayed at the influx of Ukrainians into Canada was closely intertwined with another phenomenon—the large exodus of Canadians, both English and French, to the United States. Politicians were expressing grave concern long before mass immigration commenced. Parliamentarians lamented that “the best part of our population is going away; our young men are leaving, only the old people remain behind who are not able to work the farm.”²⁶ The arrival of Ukrainians at a time when the “cream” of the Canadian population was leaving the country provoked angry editorials. The *Peterborough Morning Times*, for example, wrote:

Far better is it for Manitoba to be filled up with Canadians from Ontario or with ex-Canadians from Dakota, than with the miserable Galicians Mr. Sifton seems determined to pour into that portion of our fair domain. Let us think of the welfare of the Dominion as a whole.²⁷

This viewpoint was shared by the *Edmonton Bulletin*:

What is the matter with expending some of the money of this country in settling some of our own people out west in comfortable homes? Why go across the water to get the offscourings of the world, to Galicia, or some other point, and pick on the remnants of humanity, which have got to be made into people.²⁸

French-Canadian spokesmen also emphasized the seriousness of the problem. In 1893, a spokesman for Quebec underlined the fact that “during the past ten years the emigration from this country, especially from the province of Quebec, has been very large.”²⁹ He, too, offered solutions:

How is it... that the Government, in their wisdom, have never offered our own people, our French-Canadian compatriots, the same advantages they offer strangers brought from Europe? How is it that we have given money, passage, fares, board, etc., to strangers who are an inferior class of settlers, while our own compatriots are forced into exile? Why has not the same encouragement been offered to French-Canadians as was accorded to Europeans, under the shape of transportation fares and money bonuses?³⁰

²⁶ *Commons Debates*, 1891, p. 5233.

²⁷ *Peterborough Morning Times*, 21 March 1899.

²⁸ *Edmonton Bulletin*, 10 April 1899.

²⁹ *Commons Debates*, 1893, p. 3424.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

To French Canadians, moreover, especially those in the North-West, the maintenance and strengthening of their presence there was the objective. They feared that if the prairies were populated with foreigners susceptible to Anglo-Celtic proselytizing pressures, the Francophone element would be swamped.

Because "racial" explanations underpinned their observations, Canadians could not conceive that the Galician or Bukovinian peasant could ever improve his low standard of living. Thus, Ukrainian peasants' lifestyles were often cited as detrimental to the emergence of a highly refined and civilized nation. Even Clifford Sifton, their staunchest supporter, conceded that "of course there are some things in connection with their social habits which are more or less distasteful to the Canadians."³¹ Critics argued that if "a large number of people are content to live in squalor and ignorance, they tend to lower the standard of the whole population."³² Ukrainian dress was the most obvious object of ridicule. In 1897, the *Edmonton Bulletin* speculated that "if only Clifford Sifton could see a photograph of a newly-arrived Ukrainian 'in all the glory of' its [sic] ultra negligee attire as it [sic] parades through our streets, he would have a violent and nauseating feeling in the region of his watch pocket."³³ Commentators, obviously, found peasant attire quite unfashionable. They also objected to women and children walking around barefoot. Frank Oliver delineated the appearance of Galicians thus:

There began to appear on the platforms and in the waiting rooms of the old CPR station in Winnipeg strange men and women wearing sheep-skin coats with the wool turned inside, either very large boots or often no boots at all, the women with shawls or scarfs on their heads and hemp skirts extending not quite to the ankle.³⁴

In pointing out the characteristic guise of Ukrainians, Oliver stressed the basic lack of similarity between them and "respectable" Canadians.

Ukrainian raiment was often linked with comparisons to animals. The editor of the *Belleville Intelligencer*, for instance, wrote:

³¹ Ibid., 1899, p. 8507.

³² *Edmonton Bulletin*, 8 June 1899.

³³ Cited in Myrna Kostash, *All of Baba's Children* (Edmonton, 1977), pp. 34-35.

³⁴ *Edmonton Bulletin*, 8 June 1899.

The Galicians, they of the sheepskin coats, the filth and the vermin, do not make splendid material for the building of a great nation. One look at the disgusting creatures as they pass through over the CPR on their way west has caused many to marvel that beings bearing the human form could have sunk to such a bestial level.³⁵

The *Quebec Mercury* agreed:

Of the Galicians, there is another story to tell. They are described as being bestial in their habits, dirty and unkempt, poor in pocket and criminal in their antecedents.³⁶

Descriptions of Ukrainians were used as strong and tangible weapons against them. Basic dissimilarities were assumed to be obvious by newspaper writers:

Mr. Sifton's Galicians have not parted with any of the usages which mark them off from the rest of mankind. They heard together, and live in the same state of social depravity here as they did in the country they came from. They profess godliness, but they are as stubborn in their adherence to uncleanness as the Doukhobors are to the doctrine of non-resistance. There are some Indians in the Northwest who are pretty low down in the scale of humanity, but they appear to be above associating with the kind of Galicians Mr. Sifton has introduced.³⁷

Reporters, especially those of eastern Canada, may have had only cursory, second-hand knowledge of Ukrainians, but it did not prevent them from writing articles that inspired repulsion toward and criticism of the newcomers.

Given the negative press, it was easy to argue that the presence of such creatures would discourage desirable settlers from going to western Canada. The *Halifax Herald* concluded just that: "Their presence in our Northwest tends strongly to disgust and keep away, or drive away, persons who are really desirable as settlers."³⁸ This message was repeated in a later issue: "Every batch of Galicians put into the Northwest reduces the value of the country and tends to deter useful immigrants from going there."³⁹ Ample evidence for such conclusions was provided by

³⁵ "Belleville Intelligencer," cited in *Halifax Herald*, 18 March 1899.

³⁶ *Quebec Mercury*, 22 March 1899.

³⁷ *Guelph Daily Herald*, 11 April 1899.

³⁸ *Halifax Herald*, 18 March 1899.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 21 March 1899.

reports of English settlers moving out of Ukrainian districts. The *Toronto Mail and Empire* reported that "the Brandon Independent says that respectable settlers on the Edmonton road are moving away from good farms because there are Galicians in the neighborhood."⁴⁰

Reaction to Ukrainians was permeated with, and brought to the fore, some basic beliefs, thoughts and hopes of the period. Rooted in the racial superiority of the British people, the response underpinned fear, not only of Canada's inability to attract British settlers, but also of the emigration of Canadians to the United States. The external appearance of Ukrainians was the catalyst that amplified these fears, making them seem urgent and very real. The presence of the Ukrainians caused despair as Canadians saw their hopes of a purely English or French North-West shattered.

III

There were those Canadians, however, who did not endeavor to solve the "Ukrainian problem" by curtailing immigration. Whether motivated by political party loyalties or by economic considerations, they maintained a positive attitude. Revelling in incidents that illustrated that Ukrainians were good for Canada, they comprised the ranks of the assimilationists.

Foremost among the defenders of the Galicians was Clifford Sifton. In his speeches and in his vehicle, the *Manitoba Free Press*, he underlined positive aspects. He firmly believed that Ukrainian settlers would be successful because they had immigrated to Canada to better their position and, given the opportunity, they would continue to do so until they were indistinguishable from Canadians.

Sifton recognized that criticisms stemmed from the external appearance of the Ukrainians:

Now, with reference to the Galicians, I wish to say a few words. When I first saw these people I was not favorably impressed with them. I do not think that any one would be favorably impressed with people who have come across in an immigrant ship and an immigrant car, seeing them near the end of their journey. Their costume is peculiar and their appearance strange.⁴¹

⁴⁰ *Toronto Mail and Empire*, 10 April 1899.

⁴¹ *Commons Debates*, 1898, p. 6845.

Maintaining, nonetheless, that "that immigration is desirable which can be assimilated,"⁴² he pointed out that "after only a few months' residence in the country it is wonderful to see the change in their dress and customs."⁴³ Given his administrative and economic approach to immigration, Sifton's definition of assimilation meant economic assimilation. When the Ukrainians donned Canadian dress and became welded into the nation's economic fabric, glaring differences would disappear.

Sifton was able to maintain a positive approach to Ukrainians for two reasons. As the architect of the policy that favored them, it was politically expedient that he and his staff be their staunchest supporters. In addition, he did not set very high goals for them. He was satisfied that "the Galician is anxious to assimilate, the Galician is anxious to be independent, the Galician wants to be a Canadian, he wants his children to go to a public school."⁴⁴ But, whereas Sifton was confident that they would perform the economic function for which they were imported, the Imperialists required that they be no less than British subjects.

Sifton's rebuttals of critics of Ukrainians were based on economic arguments. Economic deprivation, for example, was not a crime for Sifton:

So far as their general habits are concerned, I may say that they are people who have lived in poverty. That is no crime on their part. I do not think that we... are prepared to say that we would not allow people to come into Canada because they have been unfortunate enough to live in poverty in the countries from which they come. I venture to say that the ancestors of many prominent citizens of Canada were poor in the country whence they came, and nobody thinks less of them on that account.⁴⁵

Sifton was not alone in fighting social arguments with economic ones. Others supported his view that Ukrainians should be judged on economic behavior:

The Galician, when he came out, had not very much coin in his pocket, and he asked the government, as he had the right to, for a small advance. The advance was given, and what was the result? Out of the very first money he earned, he paid the government back

⁴² Cited in A. Makuch, "Over Three Generations of Assimilation: Ukrainians and Identity Retention in Canada," (unpublished paper, University of Alberta, 1978), p. 2.

⁴³ *Commons Debates*, 1898, p. 6845.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 1899, p. 6862.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 1899, p. 6860.

Journal

the money he had borrowed.... I submit that a man who does that in a new country, and who does not try to live off the government, is not a bad citizen.⁴⁶

Indeed, after 1900, the initial repulsion had worn off; many Canadians began to point out the Ukrainians' economic utility:

A few years ago a howl went up against the Galicians... but today there is no person in the west who will say a word against the Galicians. They are thrifty hardworking people and they are helping us to build up that country.⁴⁷

Ukrainian economic advancement even caused some wonder:

The Galicians have taught the people of Canada to know the value of our poor lands... along the south shore of the North Saskatchewan River are regions that no person, even the most enthusiastic and optimistic Canadian, ever imagined were fit for settlement; yet these people have gone in there among those hills and have shown us that a rolling hill country, which most of us thought to be useless for settlement, can be converted into a prosperous country.⁴⁸

With a change in attitude perceptible, arguments were aimed at discrediting the critics of East-European immigration. For example, Frank Oliver, a liberal renegade and editor of the *Edmonton Bulletin*, was chastised for his opposition to the importation of Ukrainians. Sifton attempted to put Oliver's opposition in perspective: "There seems to be something about my hon. friend's [Oliver's] constitution which while it does not affect the keenness of his intellect prevents him from expressing a favorable opinion about either men or things."⁴⁹ Another politician criticized Oliver for claiming to represent the opinions of all westerners:

The Hon. member for Alberta has taken some dislike to these people, but he has no right to say that in expressing his dislike he is voicing the sentiment of the whole Northwest. He has no right to speak for the people of the west but only for those of his own constituency. In my own district I have a lot of Galicians. And if the Minister of Interior can send us more Galicians they will be welcome. If my hon. friend from Alberta is not satisfied with these in his district, let him send them to my district and I will be very glad.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Ibid., 1901, p. 2940.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 1903, p. 6600.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 1903, p. 6883.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 1901, p. 2974.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 1901, p. 2956.

Oliver was free to criticize the Ukrainians until 1905. Thereafter, he assumed the post of Minister of the Interior and became responsible for continued Ukrainian immigration.

Arguments for and against the Galicians were more or less delineated by party allegiances and were thus reflected in party newspapers, such as the Liberal *Manitoba Free Press*. Isolated criticism of Ukrainians in Liberal papers, as well as praise of Ukrainians in Conservative papers, were given much attention by the opponents and supporters of Ukrainians. Ukrainians added another issue, an emotional one, to normal political party opposition and disagreements. It was, after all, Canada's future that was being developed and, to many, Canada's national character that was being rearranged. Some newspapers sought to define the criticism and its sources:

A great deal of prejudice has been excited against the Galicians, partly through the effort of ignorant writers . . . partly also through the deliberate misrepresentation of party organs The prejudice has been confirmed and aggravated in many instances by our observation of them as they arrive in the country uncouthly clad and tired, dirty, and dejected after a journey of six or seven thousand miles. They are strange to our eyes⁵¹

Other newspapers based their conclusions on incidents:

The statement has been frequently made, both on the platform and in the press that the foreign element that was being brought to Canada would not assimilate with the people or become familiar with the genius of our institutions. That in the case of war the country could not count on their services. But a most effectual answer to the latter statements was made on Monday when L. Cohen, on behalf of twenty able-bodied Galicians, came to the *Press* office to state that these men were anxious to serve the Queen in the Transvaal War, and were ready for enlistment at any time. It is facts like these that reveal the true character of the foreign settler and the material he is composed of.⁵²

Many politicians were quick to cite incidents they found significant. One noted the example of a little girl who, when asked

⁵¹ *Toronto Mail and Empire*, 1898, cited in Andrew Gregorovich, "The Ukrainians," in Norman Sheff, ed., *Many Cultures, Many Heritages* (Toronto, 1975), p. 516.

⁵² *Dauphin Press*, 3 November 1899.

Journal

whether she was a Galician, answered "No, I am a Canadian"⁵³ to prove the worth of Ukrainians to Canada.

The reliance on incidents was necessary for both the defenders and the critics of the Ukrainians. Canadians had neither heard of nor had any prior experience with these people. They were naturally curious to learn more about the people settling in their country. The lack of familiarity necessitated a reliance on whatever characteristics could be garnered from reports of isolated incidents. Canadian knowledge of these newcomers was little more than that they were not of the superior northern race. Once they were in Canada, the host society learned either that they were hard-working, thrifty and anxious to assimilate, or that they were dirty, murderous and poor, depending on which newspaper was read. Most information about Ukrainians came second-hand and was imbued with ulterior political or economic motives.

Frank Oliver, for example, exhibited his ignorance of the reasons for emigration when he repeatedly argued:

The Germans have increased so much, that they and the native Galicians crowded each other, and it became a question for the Austrian government whether the Germans or the Galicians should leave the country. The Germans began first to leave, and some of them came to Canada, but the Austrian government, taking alarm at this movement took measures to stop it and replace it by a movement of Galicians. That is why I used in this connection the word "deportation" instead of "immigration". It is a movement of population urged by the Austrian government for the purpose of actually getting rid of these people, and it is only fair that the House should understand these facts.⁵⁴

His argument was echoed by others:

These people have never shown themselves in their native country, Russia, to be thrifty and able to make a good living on the lands on which they were established. The lands on which many of them who have come here were settled are, I am told, even finer than the lands in the North West Territories, and the climate is good, if not better. Yet with all these advantages, they have been found going off to the cities and turning out anything but desirable citizens.⁵⁵

⁵³ *Commons Debates*, 1901, p. 2943.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 1898, p. 6842; see also *Ibid.*, 1899, p. 8524, and *Ibid.*, 1901, p. 2936.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 1899, p. 6842; see also *Ibid.*, 1899, p. 8530.

Thus, most commentators knew little, if anything at all, about the conditions or the country from which Ukrainians were departing.

W. T. R. Preston, a government immigration officer stationed in London, England, visited Galicia in 1899. Together with Professor James Mavor of the University of Toronto, he toured small villages and major cities in Galicia "for the purpose of inquiring into the manner of life of this people in their native country." Preston's report was favorable:

I am fully aware that the Galician whom I have seen here, neat and tidy in his attire, although somewhat quaint to the Anglo-Saxon eyes, cheerful in his demeanour, and deferential to a marked degree, does not bear a strong resemblance to the Galician whom I have seen arrive in Canada, haggard and tired after four weeks' travel by land and sea. But I have seen his home, the village from whence he has come, the farm he has cultivated, and I have no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that given a chance in our country, and its free institutions, he will quickly become Anglicized, and through his natural thrift and industry, will develop in a few years into a citizen of whom the most sensitive Canadian will not be ashamed.⁵⁶

IV

Ukrainians were not only a political issue, but also a weapon that provincial and federal parties sought to utilize against their opponents at election time. Federal Liberals had a foothold in the Ukrainian community through immigration agents. Kyrylo Genik, F. Nestor Dmytriw, Ivan Bodrug and Ivan Negrych, leading Ukrainian spokesmen, were all at one time employed by the Liberal administration. As leaders among their countrymen, their political advice was readily accepted. In addition, the Liberal Party, along with the Presbyterian Church, lent its support to the *Kanadiyskyi Farmer*:

Our Galician paper has at last made its appearance. J. Obed/Smith and John Appleton with the assistance of a Galician interpreter are keeping an eye on the matter that goes into it. It has been thought desirable to keep contentious matter out of the first few issues; later on we shall give a few knocks to the Tories.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Cited in V. J. Kaye, "Dr. Joseph Oleskiw's Visit to Canada, August-October, 1895," *Revue de Université d'Ottawa* 33 (January-March 1962) :43.

⁵⁷ Cited in N. Kazymyra, "Political Activity of Ukrainians in Western Canada," (unpublished paper, 1976), p. 9.

Journal

Conservatives followed the lead of the Liberals by lending their support to *Slovo*. The newspaper folded after the 1904 federal election.

Both parties sought to tap the Ukrainian bloc vote. With naturalization papers a prerequisite for registration on voters' lists, Ukrainians were encouraged with liquor and tobacco to apply. In addition, it was stressed that naturalization was necessary to obtain letters patent for homesteads. On voters' lists, a Ukrainian was often listed under two or three different misspellings of his name.

In the 1903 Manitoba election, some 1,500 Ukrainians were naturalized by Conservative Party organizers. They met the language requirement—a knowledge of English, French or German—by responding to military orders given in German. Endorsement of a Ukrainian Training School for teachers by Conservative candidates was designed to assure them the Ukrainian vote.

Yet, the Ukrainian vote prior to 1905 had not been mobilized in sufficient numbers to tip the scale in favor of one or another of the political parties. Nevertheless, the encouragement of Ukrainians to vote caused much concern among English Canadians. The issue ran deeper than the underhanded buying of electoral support. At the heart of the problem was whether Ukrainians were to be given citizenship and all its rights and privileges. As one Canadian senator stated:

Just what makes a resident a citizen is not always clear. The extension of the suffrage to an individual is perhaps the truest test of the citizen, because when he attains to that privilege he commences to bear a share in the legislating and in the administration of justice in this country. He possesses the power to vote on all public issues as presented in municipal, provincial, or federal elections, or in by-laws and plebiscites. This privilege distinguishes him from the Chinaman, the Italian, the Galician and others of foreign birth and education who are unable to understand or take an interest in issues which appear to him to be vital.

Canada, like the United States, has erred very grievously in the unjustifiable extension of the suffrage to the uneducated.⁵⁸

For many, maintenance of the democratic system of government and free institutions seemed to be at stake.

Canadians believed that citizenship was more than a right. It carried with it certain responsibilities. Senator Lougheed of

⁵⁸ Canada, *Senate Debates* (hereafter *Senate Debates*), 1903, p. 167.

Alberta, for example, maintained that naturalization qualifications should be made stricter:

... take for instance the Galicians and that class of aliens. I think it is not desirable at all that simply three years residence should give such men a right to vote, except they identify themselves in some way with the institutions of the country by being able to read and write English or such other desirable qualifications.⁵⁹

Lougheed was particularly disturbed by the fact that some 60,000 to 75,000 Doukhobors, Ukrainians and others "who do not understand the English language... might be easily approached with a view to signing a declaration as to qualification" to vote:

They know nothing about it, and they sign. I have seen immediately before an election a great number of declarations being forwarded to the clerk of the court from distant points signed by all kinds of persons. I am reasonably satisfied that in many cases those people were not aware in the slightest degree of what they signed.⁶⁰

Ukrainian enfranchisement was used as an issue to inspire fear in Canadians. As one patriotic politician noted:

The Galicians are being put on the lists whether they are qualified to be there or not.... It must be... galling to those free and independent subjects of native birth that their votes can be cancelled by the wholesale stuffing of the lists with these unqualified foreigners, who, besides owing allegiance to a foreign state, know nothing of the constitution and laws of this country.⁶¹

Arguments such as the above rested on fear of the perceived political "clout" that Ukrainians could muster.

But the real fear was not based simply on extending the franchise to the Ukrainians. It was rooted in the view of Ukrainians as an interest group. It was perceived that they could be motivated to vote en bloc in favor of those who supported their demands. Canadians, not knowing what Ukrainian interests were, naturally feared that their demands would run counter to Canadian conceptions of the future character of their country. They feared that the hopes and aspirations of Ukrainians might be expressed through political action. Thus, their safest course was to demand a complete indoctrination into the British-Canadian way

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 1903, p. 269.

⁶¹ *Commons Debates*, 1899, p. 6837.

Journal

of life and institutions prior to enfranchisement. "If large communities of foreigners are to be enfranchised without being assimilated the result will be the creation of innumerable sectional interests which will prevent any national question being decided on its merits."⁶²

Apprehension that immigrants would take over Canada was real. As one parliamentarian stated:

These Galicians will in a short time have the right of the franchise, and living as a community, they will necessarily vote as community, and will certainly, if their emigration continues, be numerous enough, even if not already so, to turn the scale in any election towards that side which offers them the highest inducements.⁶³

An Edmontonian expressed similar misgivings:

They were not fit for the free institutions of this country and the time will come when they will hold the balance of political power here unless a damper is put on them very soon, and when they become our legislators God help us.⁶⁴

It was believed that Ukrainians should not be given the franchise or citizenship until after they had been assimilated into British institutions. It was even suggested that only those who would "respect and obey the laws in Canada" be permitted entry into the country.

Thus, legally, Canada extended its freedoms and opportunities to all new immigrants. But, in reality, a fierce debate raged over such a "carte blanche" approach. In day-to-day dealings, the belief in the superior "race" undermined the legal niceties. The egalitarian host society could not justify fully extending its liberties to those who, it believed, would abuse them. Ironically, while expecting the immigrants to pay homage to the superior character of Anglo-Saxondom and to emulate it, they were reluctant to allow participation in its freedoms and responsibilities.

For those already in Canada, many advocated rapid assimilation. But assimilation meant different things to different people; to some it was rather distasteful. As one politician stated:

Do you know what that word "assimilate" means? It is a nice sounding word. Do you know that it means that if you settle on a farm on the prairies amongst them or in their neighborhood

⁶² Conn, op. cit., p. 123.

⁶³ *Halifax Herald*, 21 March 1899.

⁶⁴ *Commons Debates*, 1899, p. 6837.

you must depend for the schooling of your children on the tax-paying willingness and power of people who neither know nor care anything about schools? Do you know it means the intermarriage of your sons or daughters with those who are of an alien race and alien ideas? That is assimilation, or else there is no assimilation. There is no assimilation, and there will be no assimilation for many, many years, and the whole country will suffer a drawback to that extent for a number of years.⁶⁵

Unlike Sifton, who felt that assimilation would occur when Ukrainians discarded their old-country clothing, became part of Canada's agricultural economy and expressed a willingness to learn the English language, others set much higher standards for assimilation—standards that seemed unattainable:

We also want people with whom our young folks can associate and assimilate. Do we find these qualities in the Galicians and Doukhobors? . . . both of these races are very far indeed from coming within that category. They are physically strong . . . but is that all that is expected of them? . . . As for physical strength we know that some of the lowest types of humanity are physically strong.⁶⁶

Of those that did offer advice on how best to accomplish the assimilation, most agreed that settlement of immigrants in distinct colonies was not advisable:

It is held out as one of the inducements to immigrants coming into the North West that they will be allowed to settle in distinct colonies. This policy seems fatal to any hope of assimilation.⁶⁷

Senator Lougheed expressed similar concern on this issue:

It is almost unnecessary for me to point out . . . that if you take 500 Galicians and settle them down in an isolated part of the country, withdrawn from settlement, so that no other persons can settle in that vicinity, you practically build a barricade around them, and they in no way make progress.⁶⁸

Settlement of immigrants in colonies, however, was not the only problem facing assimilators. Western British-Canadians were unwillingly saddled with the responsibilities of assimilating the foreigners. While eastern Canadians maintained that "the future

⁶⁵ Ibid., 1901, p. 2934.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 1899, p. 6837.

⁶⁷ Conn, op. cit., p. 125.

⁶⁸ *Senate Debates*, 1898, p. 1075.

Journal

of our country would be better assured if there was a liberal sprinkling of Canadian and British people among the foreigners,"⁶⁹ westerners sought to segregate themselves from immigrant settlers. J. R. Conn, a commentator, noted that "while there are obstacles to assimilation presented by the aliens, there are also decided objections on the part of those Canadians who are, to vary a war phrase, not on the fighting line, but on the assimilating line."⁷⁰

The problem of westerners associating with Galicians was presented in terms very sympathetic to the English:

First an attempt was made to settle them [Galicians] in colonies by themselves, but it was found that it would be injudicious to do that; for fear many of them might die of starvation. Therefore it was decided to distribute them amongst the English-speaking people, who with their humane instincts, will not allow them to die of starvation. But it is a great mistake to impose that burden upon our people.⁷¹

Frank Oliver was adamant in his defence of the western host society:

We went to build up a nation, a civilization, a social system that we could enjoy, be proud of and transmit to our children; and we resent the idea of having the millstone of this Slav population hung around our necks in our efforts to build up, beautify and improve that country, and so improve the whole of Canada.⁷²

Others reiterated his arguments:

The flooding of western Canada with people who are not used to the duties of citizenship is a serious question for the west and for all Canada. It is said that these strange people will assimilate with the English-speaking settlers, possibly to some extent and at great length of time. But the work of their assimilation is that much of a drag and burden upon those with whom they are expected to assimilate.⁷³

In short, western Canadians resented having, and many refused to assume, the duties of assimilation. In this regard, eastern-Canadian expectations did not coincide with western-Canadian realities,

⁶⁹ Conn, op. cit., p. 126.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ *Commons Debates*, 1898, p. 1074.

⁷² Ibid., 1901, p. 3939.

⁷³ Ibid., 1899, p. 6839.

and the “burden” on western society was resented. Many western Canadians were unable to cope not only with the presence of the foreigners, but also with the new role they were assigned—as assimilators.

V

In hindsight, the fears of Canadians were not justified. The integrity of British ideals and institutions in the North-West was not subverted. In retrospect, the arguments of the Imperialists seem trite, vicious and unwarranted. Yet, they were an outgrowth of a grand ideal they genuinely believed in. In that context the East Europeans in general, and the Ukrainians in particular, represented a mote in the apocalyptic Imperialist eye. The vision had been blemished.

George A. Perfecky

MAZEPA'S SPEECH TO HIS COUNTRYMEN

Introduction

Istoriia Rusov (The History of the Russes), an anonymous document from the end of the eighteenth or the beginning of the nineteenth century encompassing historical events in Ukraine from its earliest time to the year 1769, is a very controversial work. It was dubbed by the Ukrainian historian M. Maksymovych (1804-73) "a highly artistic embellishment of Little-Russian [Ukrainian] history," rather than a history per se, because of its many factual inaccuracies, made-up names and events not corroborated by reliable historical sources, and outright mistakes. The document, nevertheless, has been the object of serious historical research up to the present day.

According to the testimony of an eighty-five-year-old man, A. I. Khanenko (1805-96), given to the historian O. Lazarevsky in 1891, who in turn published it that year in the journal *Kievskaia starina* in an article entitled "A Conjecture as to the Author of the *Istoriia Rusov*," the manuscript of the *Istoriia Rusov* was discovered around 1828 in the library of the Hryniiv family during an inventorying of the Hlyniiv estate, which at one time belonged to Prince O. Bezborodko, in the Starodub District. Khanenko had made a copy of the manuscript, now lost, and had sent it to O. Bodiansky, the Secretary of the Imperial Historical Society for the Preservation of Russian Antiquities. Despite the work's many anti-Russian statements, Bodiansky managed to get it past the strict censor of Tsar Nicholas I and had it published in Moscow in 1846 as the *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii: Sochinenie Georgiia Koniskago, Arkhiepiskopa Beloruskago* (History of the Russes or Little Russia: a Work by the Belorussian Bishop Georgii Konisky). Yet, it seems that earlier copies, according to some researchers, were also known. Apparently the Prosvita Library in Lviv had one copied in 1818 on paper with an 1817 watermark. The Ukrainian National Museum in the same city also made a

copy; it was, however, incomplete, although its paper had an even earlier watermark, dated 1814.

As demonstrated already in the nineteenth century, Georgii Konisky (1717-95) could not have been the real author of the *Istoriia Rusov*. In it there are statements critical of organized religion and the clergy—sentiments hardly expected to have come from the pen of a conservative Orthodox archbishop. In addition to Konisky, three other *main* candidates have been proposed as authors of the work; none of them has been accepted by modern scholars as the irrefutable author of the document. They are: (1) Hryhorii Poletyka (1723/25?-84), one of the best educated political figures of the Ukrainian Hetman State, who, according to his own correspondence, was writing a work on Ukrainian history; (2) his son, Vasyl Poletyka (1765/67?-1845), or perhaps even both father and son, since the *Istoriia* has references in it that could have been made only after the elder Poletyka's death; and (3) Prince Oleksander Bezborodko (1747-99), a Ukrainian who was Chancellor of the Russian Empire under Tsar Paul I at the end of the eighteenth century.

Although dealing with Ukrainian history, *Istoriia Rusov* is written in Russian with a strong admixture of Ukrainian words and proverbs. One also finds in it biblical terms and expressions, and foreign—that is, western-European—borrowings, such as “nation,” “ministry,” “neutrality,” and “balance of power,” which seem to come from the time of the French Revolution. Moreover, the work is permeated with an eighteenth-century spirit of democracy; it contains such statements as “Every human being has the right to defend his life, freedom, and possessions . . . God Himself or Nature has endowed him with the means to do this,” which coincide with the American belief in man's right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” found in the Declaration of Independence. And yet, in the course of research on this document, *Istoriia Rusov* has been scorned by many a historian as a “historical pamphlet,” a “journalistic work,” or, at best, a “historical legend.”

But despite its obvious flaws, its contents are just as relevant today—almost two hundred years later—as they were when the work was first discovered. “Why?” one might ask. The answer is unequivocally clear. No other work, with the exception of Shevchenko's *Kobzar*, has had as great an influence on the formation of Ukrainian national consciousness as the anonymous *Istoriia Rusov*. Imbedded in it is the age-old yearning of Ukrainians for national independence—a yearning that is expressed, however, not by the anonymous author, but by persons in this work who are

Journal

viewed as traitors or enemies in official Russian historiography. (This rhetorical device apparently made the contents of the work palatable to the imperial censor.) The following translation of Ivan Mazepa's speech to the Cossacks, which purportedly took place after Mazepa had crossed the Desna river in 1708 and is based on pp. 202-4 of the 1846 edition, may serve as an excellent example of this sentiment.

"We Stand Today Between Two Abysses" (Mazepa's Speech to His Countrymen in 1708)

We stand today between two abysses, my brethren, ready to devour us if we do not choose a reliable path in order to avoid them. The warring monarchs, who have moved the theatre of war close to our borders, have become so enraged at each other that nations subjugated by them are already suffering and will continue to suffer an infinitude of immeasurable ills. Between them we are but a dot on the map, the target of all this misery cast upon us. Because of their lawlessness and [brutal] appropriation of unlimited power, both [monarchs] can be compared to the most horrible of despots, the likes of which one doubts if all of Asia and Africa has ever brought into this world. And for this reason the one who will be vanquished and defeated will also bring his own country to ruin and complete annihilation. Fate has chosen the lot of these countries to be decided in our native land and before our very eyes. And seeing this threat hanging over our heads, how can we not help but ponder and think about our own fate? My judgement, which is devoid of all passions and intentions pernicious to the heart, is as follows: when the ever-victorious Swedish king, whom all of Europe respects and fears, defeats the Russian tsar and destroys his tsardom, then we, at the will of the victor, will be unavoidably attached to Poland and returned to Polish servitude, where we will be at the will of his favorite, King Leszczyński, whom he created. And when this happens, there will be no place then or in the future for treaties dealing with our rights and privileges, and previous treaties and agreements stipulating these rights and privileges will become void, for we naturally will be considered a conquered people, [a nation] subjugated by force of arms. [To put it bluntly] we are destined to become slaves, and our ultimate fate will be worse than that of former times, which our forebears endured with such great anguish that the mere mention of it strikes terror in our hearts.

And [on the other hand] if we let the Russian tsar emerge victorious, then from that very same tsar only evil will come upon

us, for it is evident that although he is descended from a line of rulers elected by the [Russian] people from among their own nobility, he wantonly punishes that people, having appropriated unlimited power. And not only the freedom and the common good, but the very life of that people are subject solely to the tsar's will and whim. You have also been witness to the consequences of that despotism, with which he destroyed countless families by the most barbarous of punitive measures for offences derived from slander and extracted with [such] tyrannical tortures that no nation [on earth] could bear or endure them. The beginnings of our common misfortunes I experienced upon my own person, for, as you know —for my refusal to be party to his designs, which are fatal to our native land—I had my face slapped like a common whore. And is there anyone here who will not agree that a tyrant who so shamefully insulted a person representing a nation surely must consider its members to be merely dumb cattle and his own excrement? And indeed he must think that they are just that if he received Voinarovsky with slaps to the face, threw him in prison, and wanted to send him to the gallows, from which he [Voinarovsky] was rescued only by a timely escape. [The latter] had been sent to him as a delegate by the [Ukrainian] people with a complaint against the insolent and brutal acts of violence perpetrated against them constantly by the Muscovite armies, as well as with a request to confirm the articles of the treaty that had been [officially] drawn up when Khmelnytsky declared fealty, but which the tsar had not yet confirmed, although he certainly should have, according to the treaty.

And thus, my brethren, we are left with choosing the lesser of the [two] perceptible evils that have befallen us, so that our descendants, cast into slavery through our inability to act, will not burden us with their curses and complaints. I have no offspring and, of course, cannot have any; consequently I take no active part in the interests of posterity, and I seek nothing except the good fortune of that nation that has honored me by bestowing the dignity of *hetman* upon me and thus has entrusted me with its destiny. Accursed would I be and totally without conscience if I were to repay your kindness with evil and to betray this nation for my own interests! The time has come for me to divulge to you which path I have chosen for this nation and indeed for you yourselves. My long years of experience in politics and my knowledge of the people's interests have opened my eyes to the present situation in international affairs and how they are about to affect our native land. In such a case it is considered the greatest skill to keep a secret inaccessible to all until the time comes to reveal

Journal

it. This [secret] I entrusted to myself alone, and its own importance will justify my actions to you. I have met with both warring kings, the Swedish and the Polish, and have used all of my talents before them in order to convince the former to be inclined toward mercy for our native land and toward protection from military aggression and from destruction during the future onslaught against it. And as far as Great Russia is concerned, which shares the same faith and is of the same race as we, I have managed to obtain the tsar's agreement to our neutrality; that is, that we engage neither the Swedes, the Poles, nor the Great Russians, but instead, having gathered own forces, we stand [ready] at appropriate points and defend our own native land, repelling any aggressor who might attack it, of which fact we would immediately inform the tsar. And his boyars, who have not yet become infected with Germanophilia and remember the innocently shed blood of their relatives, have also been informed of all of this and are in agreement with me. For all of the warring armies we should provide, in return for payment, food and forage in the largest amount possible without causing our own impoverishment. [Moreover,] a decision has been reached that in the future general armistice of all the warring states, our own country be placed in that position among nations that it enjoyed before the time of Polish domination—with its own native-born princes and with all its former rights and privileges that characterize a free nation. France and Germany—the foremost nations of Europe—have taken it upon themselves to guarantee this, and [indeed] the latter had insisted vehemently that we enjoy such a status still in the days of Hetman Zynovii [Bohdan] Khmelnytsky, during the reign of Emperor Ferdinand III, but this never came to pass because of the internecine wars and lack of deliberation on the part of our ancestors. The points of our agreement concerning the aforementioned I drew up with the Swedish King in a written document, signed by both sides and made public in the countries designated in it. And [thus from] now [on] we should consider the Swedes our friends, allies and benefactors, [indeed] as if sent by God [Himself] to free us from slavery and the indignities we have suffered and to give us a new life to be enjoyed at the highest level of [personal] liberty and independence. For it is well known that at one time we were what the Muscovites are now, for the [first form of] government, pre-eminence, and the name Rus' itself were transferred from us to them. Yet now they hold us up as an object of derision and reproof! These points of agreement with Sweden are not new nor the first we have drawn up with that country. They confirm and renew former treaties and alliances drawn up by our forefathers

with the Swedish kings, for it is commonly known that the grandfather and father of the present Swedish king, in return for the important services rendered them by our armies in their war against the Livonians, Germans and Denmark, guaranteed [the sovereignty of] our country and often interceded on its behalf with the Poles. And therefore, already after the union with Russia, Hetman Khmelnytsky sent a strong Cossack contingent, which was led by the deputy hetman Adamovych, to aid the Swedish king, Gustav, and aid him it did during the taking of the Polish capitals of Warsaw and Cracow. Thus, our present treaties with Sweden are only a continuation of former ones that had been in force among all nations. For indeed, what kind of a nation would [we] be if [we] did not care for [our] own interests and did not do everything to ward off obvious danger? [We would be] a nation [that] through its inability to act would truly resemble dumb animals, scorned by all other nations.

Translated by George A. Perfecky

On Mazepa's Origins*

Hetman Mazepa was born a Pole, but of Lithuanian** lineage. It was said that he fled from Poland for unknown reasons and was admitted into the household of Samoilovich, whose children he taught for seven years. Then he joined the Little-Russian registered Cossacks by enlisting in the Pereiaslav Regiment. And because these Cossacks took part in almost constant military campaigns, at times against the Poles and at other times against the Tatars and the Turks—during which Mazepa always distinguished himself by his courage, perseverance, and military skill, for which he was rewarded with promotions in rank—he was finally promoted to the rank of Adjutant General after seventeen years of service and, of course, not without the help of Hetman Samoilovich. However, he never attained those ranks and offices that, in accordance with the laws of this country, are in the possession of native and established officials, for he had no permanent residence or family here, except for his sister Ianelia, whom he had summoned from Poland during the first days of his arrival. He gave her hand in

* from *Istoriia Rusov* (1846), p. 184.

** i.e., his family dates back to the old Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which was Lithuanian only in administration, but Ruthenian in every other respect.

Journal

marriage to Myrovych, an official of the Pereiaslav Regiment, and from this marriage he later had nephews and grandchildren, many of whom became colonels in the Cossack army and other important Little-Russian officials. The eminent philosopher and writer Voltaire, in his history of the Swedish King Charles XII, writes about Mazepa that "he was Polish-bred and raised in that country by Jesuits, as a result of which he was well versed in several superior fields of knowledge, to use the idiom of that time. But when he served at the Court of the Polish King Casimir, he was persecuted by a certain distinguished nobleman who wanted to do away with him for his love affairs with women [of the court]. For this reason, he fled from Poland on a wild Cossack stallion without knowing where he was going. But the stallion carried him back to its own native land, to a settlement of Cossacks, who accepted him into their society and in time made him their highest-ranking official for his notable military achievements. These Cossacks are a free and courageous people; they defend their freedom with arms and are ready to defend it always against all nations that want to enslave them. For this reason, they recently waged a long, drawn-out and horrible war against the Poles and turned their vast yet ungainly republic into a wasteland. A change in protection threatens them again with enslavement, but the spirit of freedom seeks its own defense. "It resembles gunpowder: weak when there is moisture, but fierce in the presence of fire."

Translated by George A. Perfecky

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY IN ENGLISH

- Ohloblyn, O. "The Ethical and Political Principles of *Istoriya Rusov*." *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 2, no. 4 (1952), pp. 388-400.
- Ohloblyn, O. "Where Was *Istoriya Rusov* Written?" *Ibid.*, 3, no. 2 (1953), pp. 670-95.
- Yakovliv, A. "*Istoriya Rusov* and its Author." *Ibid.*, 3, no. 2 (1953), pp. 620-69.
- Doroshenko, D. *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*. New York, 1957, pp. 76-92.

REVIEWS

ALEXANDER J. MOTYL, *THE TURN TO THE RIGHT: THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM, 1919-1929*. Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs Series, no. 65, 1980. 212 pp. Dist. by Columbia University Press.

By the time that the Civil War in Ukraine ended in 1920, thousands of soldiers and political activists on the side of the Central Rada, Skoropadsky's Hetman regime or the Directory under Petliura had emigrated to Polish-occupied Galicia, or to Warsaw, Prague, Vienna and other major central-European cities. As they awaited new opportunities to struggle for a Ukrainian state independent of Russia, the émigrés began to appraise their recent and unsuccessful efforts. In retrospect, this assessment served as a cornerstone for the launching of a second major attempt at national liberation—"druhi *vyzvolni zmahannia*"—by a new, right-wing nationalist movement. Alexander Motyl shows in this short, well-written and original contribution what the conservative survivors of the 1917-20 period passed on to the nascent nationalist movement in the following decade.

Very little in the way of a critique of the interwar nationalist movement has been attempted by its participants, so it has fallen upon the shoulders of the present generation of scholars to reconstruct this important historical period. Alexander Motyl, who was not a participant in the movement, chose to deal with the first decade, focussing on developments in Polish-occupied Galicia (excluding, therefore, Volhynia, Bukovina in Rumania and Transcarpathian Ukraine in Slovakia). He also chose to deal with movement's *ideas*, world view and program for national liberation, excluding from consideration the social and economic sources of interwar nationalism. The continuity of the presentation is provided by Motyl's tracing the fortunes of the defeated contenders for a Ukrainian state—Skoropadsky and the monarchists, Petrushevych and other leaders in the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, Petliura and the moderate socialists, Konovalets and the Sich Sharpshooters—as they went into exile, regrouped and invested their energies in work with young Ukrainians in Galicia and the main cities of Central Europe.

A lot of digging into primary sources has enabled Motyl to reconstruct this regroupment and to show how the nationalist alternative ripened in the émigré hothouse of the 1920s, gaining an especially sympathetic hearing among the veterans, students and impoverished intellectuals of Galicia. Of particular interest is Motyl's account of the intensive efforts

Journal

by the UVÖ (Ukrainian Military Organisation) to stimulate a written debate on the burning issues facing the liberation struggle by reviving the *Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk*, and launching *Zahrava* and the illustrated political magazine *Novyi Chas*. The UVÖ's campaign of assassinations and bombings of Polish authorities during the 1920s has been highlighted in previous works to the detriment of this equally important area of political activity.

Motyl has also given serious consideration to the question of whether the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists)—the mature organizational expression of this movement—was fascist. The question cannot be ignored, because there is much in the 1929 OUN program and in the political writings of Dmytro Dontsov and of other prominent nationalist publicists to show the influence of European fascism. Motyl suggests that there was a crucial difference between the national tasks elaborated by the Italian fascist dictatorship, entrenched in state power, and the Ukrainian nationalists seeking to establish an independent nation-state. In defining the ideological origins of the latter, Motyl adds, it is necessary to give primary attention to the traditions of Ukrainian conservative thought that preceded and underlined the new post-revolutionary era, for this conservative thought provided the original parameters within which the pioneers of the nationalist movement began to develop their world view and political strategy.

Certain criticisms of Motyl's well-prepared monograph are, nevertheless, in order. As an intellectual history, the book is accessible to those possessing an elementary knowledge of the revolutionary period, the international situation in the 1920s, and the evolving situation in Poland and Soviet Ukraine. For the newcomer to this problem, much of what Motyl has to say will not be appreciated, because the reader is not given enough "background" information. Failing to ground his analysis of the development of nationalist ideas in the material—social, political and international—processes of the day, Motyl presents us with a scenario of seemingly rootless émigrés, driven by their recent defeats to find a new set of ideas to inspire the masses. Motyl treats these ideas as though they somehow live their own life several metres above the din of everyday life. As if possessing an inherent force of their own, nationalist ideas are assessed not in relation to the major preoccupations of the Galician Ukrainians and other Ukrainians in Eastern Europe during the 1920s, but in relation to the "discredited" ideas of the previous era—socialism and democracy.

Why, indeed, did the Ukrainian social democrats and socialist revolutionaries fail to establish an independent state during the Revolution and Civil War? Motyl merely repeats the nationalists' charge: "democracy, socialism and lack of will," in other words, the SDs' and SRs' ideology and flaws of character, were to blame.

Such an answer merely begs the question, for it does not provide even a clue about the needs and desires of the Ukrainian peasants, workers and intellectuals who took part in the revolutionary struggles and were forced to choose and reject the governments on their soil. Something can be gained by comparing the ideologies of the nationalist period with the preceding social-democratic and peasant-revolutionary doctrines. But such a comparison cannot account for the *force* of the ideologies of each respective period; this can be appreciated only by examining the relationship of ideologies to the large social and political processes that reflected the needs and the desires of the masses of Ukrainians. To examine an ideology in isolation from its experiential origins can lead not only to confusion on the part of the newcomer to the subject, but also to questionable conclusions in the study itself.

Perhaps Motyl feels comfortable in his chosen framework because he is dealing with milieus of people uprooted from their social base. The émigré hothouse is conducive to the struggle of ideas conducted in cafes and bars. But this framework becomes problematic when the relevance of nationalist politics to the young generation in Galicia is examined. The nationalist movement found its main base of support in Galicia, the home of the largest concentration of Ukrainians outside the Soviet Union between the world wars. Until the veterans of the 1917-20 period came into contact with this five-million-strong national minority in Poland, particularly with the student milieu, they remained simply émigrés, demobilised soldiers and uprooted political activists without a social base. It was not the “Ukrainian emigration [that] became the center of the national movement in the post-war decade” (p. 20), but Galicia, where the émigrés encountered a Ukrainian minority whose national identity had been forming over decades of struggle with the Polish ruling class. The OUN’s emergence cannot be explained satisfactorily without referring to this fusion between émigré veterans and the embattled minority in interwar Poland.

Motyl’s frame of reference has led to an underestimation of the communist movement in Galicia, and of the relationship between its changing fortunes in the 1920s and the fortunes of the emergent nationalists. Motyl acknowledges that the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) was a powerful influence in the student movement, and that in the 1928 elections to the Polish Sejm and Senate, its front organization, Sel-Rob, captured eighteen of the forty-eight seats that went to Ukrainian parties. Indeed, throughout the 1920s, the Communist movement in Western Ukraine enjoyed widespread and growing support because it spoke to the social, as well as national, interests of the peasantry and workers and because of the apparent success of the Ukrainianization policies in the neighbouring Soviet Ukrainian republic between 1925 and 1928. From 1926 to 1928, the KPZU membership was firmly behind Shumsky’s pro-Ukraini-

Journal

zation faction in the Communist Party of Ukraine. As the Stalin-Kaganovich faction drove Shumsky's group out of the Party, brought Ukrainization to a halt, and began to destroy the most active leaders of the national renaissance of the 1920s, it also set out to smash the pro-Shumsky majority in the KPZU. In explaining the rise of the nationalist movement in Galicia in the latter half of the 1920s, the simultaneous demise of the Communist movement cannot be ignored. Chapter Five of Motyl's work, "The Sovietophiles," is disappointing not so much because it is less than four pages long, but, rather, because Motyl seems to have missed this point. While Ukrainization across the border gathered momentum and Stalinism had not yet dominated the Communist movement in Galicia and Ukraine, the KPZU grew in importance as the radical advocate of Ukrainian national liberation in Galicia. Its star began to wane in 1929, the year that the OUN was founded.

These observations notwithstanding, Motyl's work is a welcome and much needed contribution to our understanding of Ukrainian nationalism. Given the limited pressrun of the first edition, a second printing should be undertaken, this time perhaps in paperback.

J. Marko Bojcun
York University

JOSEPH T. FUHRMANN, *TSAR ALEXIS, HIS REIGN AND HIS RUSSIA*. Gulf Breeze, Fl.: Academic International Press, 1981. vii, 250 pp.

Fuhrmann's study of Tsar Alexis belongs to the "better-than-nothing" category of scholarly books. Since there are so few studies on seventeenth-century Muscovy available in Western languages, an English-language work on the subject is bound to be a "contribution" to the field. And it is to the author's credit that he has carefully gleaned from Kliuchevsky, Solovev and other Russian specialists much of what they wrote about Alexis. Moreover, Fuhrmann has systematized this information and presented it in more or less readable English. Undoubtedly, for that rare undergraduate who needs to read up on Alexis, Fuhrmann's work will be of use. However, if one is looking for new data, interpretations or insights about the Tsar and his reign, this book has little to add. It is a compilation, pure and simple, of what leading Russian historians have written on the topic. It is a pity that the book does not have footnotes, for then it would be very obvious how greatly indebted the author is to the classic studies in the field.

Since one of the most important issues during Alexis's reign was that of Russian-Ukrainian relations, one would expect to find in Fuhrmann's book a meaningful discussion of this subject. Unfortunately, this

is not the case. Fuhrmann tells us much more about how Alexis dressed and dined than about the epochal union of Russia and Ukraine. And what little is noted about the Cossacks, Ukraine and Khmelnytsky consists of old, hackneyed stereotypes: Ukraine is a "...fertile borderland of the medieval Russian state"; Khmelnytsky is a "...gallent [sic], spirited and often unscrupulous man"; and the Cossacks are "...these rough, freedom-seeking fugitives... leading a hearty life hunting, fishing and tending livestock." This sort of information may have sufficed for the movie script of *Taras Bulba*, but one has a right to expect a more sophisticated treatment of the Ukrainian issue from a specialist in seventeenth-century Russian history.

Orest Subtelny
Hamilton College

WALTER DUSHNYCK, ED., *UKRAINE IN A CHANGING WORLD*. New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1977. iii, 291 pp.

This book consists of the "papers presented at the conference dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the founding of The Ukrainian Quarterly" on 7 December 1974 in New York City. Not surprisingly, given the variety of contributions, the title—*Ukraine in a Changing World*—is more a catch-all than an accurate description of the contents. But least surprisingly, the book reflects the uneven quality of the *Quarterly* itself.

What, for example, is one to make of an editor who insists on affixing "Ph.D." to his name? (Readers of *ABN Correspondence* will ask: "So what? Slava Stetsko is just as proud of her M.A!") Or of Walter Dushnyck's description of Lev Dobriansky and the late Stephen Shumeyko as "intellectual Americans of Ukrainian descent"? And how seriously should one take a journal that boasts of having been called a "top American 'Kremlinologist' center" in the US by ... *Slovansky Prehled*, the organ of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences? And finally, is it necessary, in one of the biographical sketches appended to the book, to note that the contributor "speaks the Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, French, German and Portuguese languages, and has a reading knowledge of Czech, Slovak, Serbian, Croatian and Bulgarian, and a grounding in classical Latin and Greek"?

The point of these examples, of course, is that they reveal so very accurately the tragicomic "*khochu, ale ne mozhu*" nature of the *Quarterly* and of the collection under review. Particularly amazing is that the editors of the *Quarterly* seem to be so blissfully unaware of these shortcomings. Such naivete can be breathtaking. But how does one reconcile it with the *Quarterly's* tasks, as spelled out by Mr. Dushnyck: "To help prevent the possible recurrence of such lamentable ignorance of essential facts; to

Journal

familiarize the United States and the Western world with the story of Ukraine and other captive nations; to combat vitiating Russian propaganda, and, above all, to fully disclose the nature and aims of the enemy”?

And now for the good news: this collection does contain a number of articles worth reading. Z. Lew Melnyk’s “The Economic Price of Being a Soviet Republic: The Case of Ukraine,” Bohdan R. Bociurkiw’s “Religious Situation in Soviet Ukraine,” Stefan T. Possony’s “From Gulag to Guit,” and Sen. Paul Yuzyk’s “Ukrainian Church Life in Canada Since 1945” are valuable and informative scholarly pieces. Of interest are Joseph S. Roucek’s “Neglected Aspects of the Slavs in American Historiography,” Howland H. Sargeant’s “Radio Liberty and Ukraine,” and Peter G. Stercho’s “Ukraine and Her Southwestern Neighbors: Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Hungary.” Lev Dobriansky’s and Anthony T. Bouscaren’s lengthy tirades against detente are interesting for revealing the ideological foundations of the *Quarterly* and its publisher, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, while Walter Dushnyck’s summary of the *Quarterly*’s “Thirty Years of Generating Enlightenment and Freedom” is informative, if somewhat self-congratulatory. Perhaps most disappointing is the late Michael Sosnowsky’s article on dissent in Ukraine.

All in all, a passable performance. Perhaps next time the *Quarterly* will quit patting itself on the back and get down to serious work.

Alexander J. Motyl
Columbia University

EDWARD ALLWORTH, ED., *ETHNIC RUSSIA IN THE USSR: THE DILEMMA OF DOMINANCE*. New York, Oxford, Toronto, Sydney, Frankfurt and Paris: Pergamon Press, in cooperation with the Program on Soviet Nationality Problems at Columbia University, 1980. xxi, 346 pp.

This volume marks an important watershed in North American scholarship. It attempts to identify, assess and analyse the “Russian ethnic group” in the multiethnic conglomerate known as the Soviet Union.

An outgrowth of the colloquium “Ethnic Russia Today: Undergoing an Identity Crisis?” held at Columbia University in 1978 and supplemented by later contributions, the material in the book is organised around nine major propositions. These are designed to test and evaluate Russian ethnic cohesiveness, identity, national consciousness, and self-interest as viewed in their religious, cultural, demographic, economic and political dimensions.

Each section of the book contains two to five articles (several by graduate students), as well as one to three critical commentaries. Most of the articles are of a high calibre, especially those by graduate students.

The book also has an excellent introduction, a closing statement, an appendix containing statistical tables on Russian population, an index, and a note about the contributors.

All nine propositions of this multidisciplinary volume are couched in a "neutral" terminology of modern social science and are put forward in order to be supported or rejected by the scholars. For example, proposition four states:

The renewed ideological emphasis placed by Soviet authorities upon the supposed unity of the "Soviet People [*narod*]" as a whole tends to dampen Russian self-awareness and obscure external identity politically. [p. 147]

And proposition five says that

Russians lack some of the crucial official recognition (for example a branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union designated for the RSFSR, a separate union republic capital for "Russia," or a specific arm of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR) which supports the group awareness of many other Soviet ethnic groups. This deprivation may continue to deny significant support to Russian ethnic identity. [p. 177]

This preoccupation with a value-free terminology is also evident in the use of "ethnocentrism" as a substitute for nationalism, and in discarding the word "minority" as an ethnic-group designation in order to avoid ambiguity. Such elementary terms as "*russkii*" and "*rossiiskii*" are also explained, and the anachronism "Great Russian" (the staple of Western journalists and some scholarly dinosaurs) is finally laid to rest.

The emphasis in the volume on objective scholarship is, of course, very welcome. The organisation, however, forces the contributors into endless repetitions, some of which may be contradictory. Some of this, admittedly, is unavoidable in a volume composed of many articles in various disciplines. More importantly, however, most of the propositions strike this reader as being somewhat artificial. Several of the contributors and commentators must have felt similarly. Rywkin and Medish strongly dispute proposition five, while Bialer calls it simply a "misstated concern about a real case of reverse discrimination" (p. 197). Again, Rasiak and, even more strongly, Fedyshyn, in referring to proposition four, show that the notion of the "Soviet People" for most Russians is simply a substitute term for their own nationality ("Kak khorosho chto Iu. Gagarin/ ne tungus i ne tatarin,/ On ne khokhol i ne uzbek,/ A nash sovetskii chelovek" [p. 156]).

In the cultural, linguistic and religious spheres, the Russians seem to face some problems, as a number of excellent articles in the book are

Journal

able to show. The Derevenshchiki movement is a case in point (see propositions two, three and seven). But even here, as Gibian correctly observes, "an immensely significant part of Russian ethnocentrism would be missed if it were thought that ruralists expressed all there was" (p. 100).

Most of the contributors to the volume do not view the Russians as suffering from a paralysing identity crisis, but rather see them as a vibrant, highly educated, urbanized, modern nation, both dominant and dominating and using their position and status to some advantage. (Witness, for example, the economic development of the non-black-earth region.) On balance, therefore, if a nation is to have a dilemma, it is not bad to have a dilemma based on a position of dominance.

The Russians, like any other people, differ among themselves in their perceptions of the problems they face. As Szporluk clearly suggests (with some allowance for oversimplification), the Russian "ethnocentrist opinion" may be grouped under two broad headings—the "culturalist" current ("which considers the language, literature, ancestral homelands and religion as markers of Russian identity" [p. 41]), and the "statist" current (which views the history of the Russian state "as the most genuine expression of the Russian ethnic group" [p. 41]). And while the "culturalist" trend "poses a most serious danger to the Soviet regime, because it denies its legitimacy and aims at its overthrow" (p. 51), the "statist" stream, whose adherents "believe in the Russian empire," does not seem to endanger the regime, for it "legitimizes Bolshevism in Russian ethnocentric terms" (p. 51). The relative weight of these two trends within the Russian community must remain open to further study and analysis. But in Szporluk's opinion, as far as the non-Russians are concerned, it is only the culturalists (or at least some elements among them) who are amenable to separation and national independence.

The book deserves careful reading not only for the wealth of material it contains, but also for mapping out important areas for further research. In this context, the articles by Keenan and Denitch are especially valuable. Professor Allworth deserves special thanks for this initiative.

Peter J. Potichnyj
McMaster University

MYROSLAVA STEFANIUK AND FRED E. DOHRS, *UKRAINIANS OF DETROIT*. Peopling of Michigan Series. Detroit: Center for Urban Studies, Wayne State University, 1979. vi, 113 pp.

For the reader (presumably non-Ukrainian) who does not mind the colossal misnomer, *Ukrainians of Detroit* may be a useful little book that packs a lot of information between its blue-and-yellow covers. As it is,

only sixteen of its ninety-six pages deal with the Ukrainian community in that city, the remainder being a thumbnail sketch of Ukrainian history, geography, culture, population and its migration patterns, with somewhat restrained references to the "national cause."

Perhaps most of the booklet's weaknesses stem from the authors' apparent inability to decide whether they wanted to write another popular "truth about Ukraine" brochure or a scholarly work. The physical dimensions and the visual layout point to the former; yet, the book is academically sponsored, includes a respectable if somewhat randomly collected bibliography, and just swarms with footnotes. Unfortunately, the utilization of sources leaves much to be desired. Information on such specialized (and remote) subjects as the historic balance of power in Europe, the activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and the present population of Ukraine is taken from a symposium on Ukrainians in Pennsylvania; technical comments on language are based on a 1925 publication entitled *Ukraine's Claim to Freedom*, and so forth. Many recent sources are not mentioned, and Bachynsky's old classic, *Ukrainska emigratsiia v ZDA*, is cited only once.

The whole gives an impression of having been hastily put together (to meet a grant deadline?). One sure sign of less than careful editing are the numerous inconsistencies. Without wasting any time, the authors complain on page one about the reigning confusion between "Ukrainian" and "Russian," and yet the caption under a drawing of Ukrainian women at work (p. 83) credits it to *Sketches of the Russian People*. The Note on transliteration vows to avoid Russian-based spelling of Ukrainian names, but one finds "Dniepro," "Vera," and (ouch!) "chernozem." "White Russians" is the alternate designation for our Belorussian neighbors on p. 7, but on p. 20 the name is used to refer to the armies of Denikin and his friends.

Perhaps the most frustrating experiences await the reader who would look for some enlightening statistics. The present Ukrainian population in the Ukrainian SSR is said, on p. 28, to be 49 million; it shrinks to 47 million on p. 30, and to 32.6 million on the next page. The number of Ukrainians in other Soviet Republics ranges from 5.5 million on p. 30 to 15.7 million on p. 32. Similarly, different estimates are given for the United States; here, the highest figure of two million is difficult to reconcile with the total of 280,000 for the six largest cities—the reader is left wondering where the other 1,720,000 are hiding. If the authors' intent was to show specific reasons why reliable statistics on Ukrainians are hard to come by, surely this could have been done without bombarding the uninitiated with what must seem contradictory figures and ultimately leaving them without the expected information. Then also, considering the general nature of the information in the book, it seems unwarranted to go into detailed discussions of different estimates.

Journal

On the bright side, there is hardly any outright misinformation, a curse that often befalls "omnibus" publications of this type. There is one item that should be mentioned: the assertion that "organized life began to take shape" in the Displaced Persons camps only when the U.S.-based UUARC established its "local offices" at the "various sites." Not only did the Ukrainian DPs start organizing the moment the war ended in 1945, but the UUARC (and other agencies that aided their resettlement) usually maintained offices at a few large "processing" centers and had little, if any, bearing on the day-to-day activities within individual camps.

One finds omissions of various degrees of seriousness. The otherwise good discussion of the DPs' adjustment in the U.S. correctly points up important differences between the kind of community organizations they started and those established by earlier immigrants; but it lays these to different time periods "as well as . . . socio-economic and political conditions." There is no mention of either the demographic (particularly educational) composition of the postwar arrivals, their nationalistic motivation, or previously acquired organizational habits and styles. At another point the authors write about the battle of Poltava, but say nothing about Konotop. A list of pressures toward emigration leaves out a key consideration for young males—military conscription.

Other omissions seem due to rushed editing. On p. 37, the authors mention the reconciliation of many Orthodox with Rome without ever having mentioned the Great Schism; Ukrainian literature "moves through" Realism, Neoclassicism and Impressionism, but skips Romanticism (p. 33); the Ukrainian Catholics' switch to the Latin rite or to the Orthodox Church in the U.S. is not really explained (p. 53). Figure 38 carries the emblem of SKVU, but that important body is never mentioned in the text; in addition, the caption under the figure does not identify one of the other logos in the illustration.

Another indication of editorial absent-mindedness is jumping between topics, as on p. 13, where the same short paragraph deals with traditional songs and with a contrast between political regimes. Similarly, on pp. 87-8, information on Detroit is interspersed with references to Ukrainian studies at Harvard and Ukrainian contributions to American culture.

Stefaniuk and Dohrs indulge in some value judgments and interpretations that, given supporting data, could have a proper place in an analytical discussion; here they seem hazardous and out of context. Thus it is claimed that it was the immigrants' "highly developed sense of self . . . based on their native village backgrounds and . . . heritage, which helped them to surmount the problems facing them" (p. 49); and a few pages earlier, referring to the beginning of large-scale emigration, the authors have no doubt that "the national cause was weakened by the loss of these . . . younger, stronger, and more enterprising Ukrainians." They

diagnose the “collapse of [the] emergent Ukrainian state” as “inevitable” without giving any reason for such an assessment.

Now for the good news. Despite all its shortcomings, *Ukrainians of Detroit* is basically equipped to perform its function: acquainting outsiders with some of the dimensions of the “Ukrainian problem.” The authors make many good points, especially about the recent immigration to the United States. They point out, for example, that the DPs had difficulties adjusting to American life both because, unlike earlier immigrants, they had not left the homeland voluntarily, and because the well educated among them suffered occupational and social “demotion.” The organizations they formed are perceived as oriented toward the eventual return to Ukraine. These are things not many among us talk—or write—about, and yet they have played an important part in the direction the Ukrainian community has taken since the Second World War, including, probably, its failure to come to terms with the staggering problems of ethnic identity and culture maintenance among the young.

The authors do well to focus on the circumstances of *emigration* as well as the problems of immigrants in the new land, something which is rather rare in the literature. They astutely observe that the relatively few immigrants who came to the U.S. between the two world wars were still economically motivated but also much more nationality-conscious than the earlier arrivals. This, together with the shift from mining areas to large cities, made possible the organizational consolidation of the Ukrainian community in this period.

The information is presented in bite-size paragraphs and, for the most part, kept simple and relevant. At some points, comparisons with the state of Michigan are used to make the population losses in Ukraine stand out vividly; direct quotations are employed sparingly but are extremely well chosen.

The book’s design is quite fetching, and most of the maps and illustrations are visually satisfying and to the point (this reviewer’s favorite is figure 58), even though some of the captions could be improved upon. Some minor errors of language strike the reader as preventable. “Deported” and “disparities” are used in the wrong sense (pp. 40, 42); the same seems to be true of “reflected” on p. 33. One finds “occupational level became wider” (p. 84) and “social . . . societies” (p. 17), but on the whole the book reads pretty smoothly.

There is an epilogue, bringing the reader up to date on recent developments in Ukraine. Again, Detroit as such does not seem to be on the authors’ minds.

Ihor V. Zielyk
Seton Hall University

Journal

А. А. БУРЯЧОК і І. І. ГУРИН, СЛОВНИК УКРАЇНСЬКИХ РІМ. Київ: "Наукова думка", 1979. 338 стор.

Під маркою Інституту Мовознавства ім. Потебні видавництво "Наукова думка" в Києві випустило "Словник українських рим", що його упорядкували Андрій Бурячок та Іван Гурин і відредактував Євген Кирилюк.

У принципі появу такого словника можна б тільки вітати. Про актуальність видання свідчить зокрема те, що до укладання — в кожному випадку свого власного словника рим — узялися одночасно представники трьох розрізнених струменів нашої культури: офіційного, дисидентського та еміграційного. Відомо, що словник рим, у перерві між двома ув'язненнями, склав був Святослав Караванський, але цього словника конфісковано під час спроби перевезти його за кордон і прилучено до справи Караванського як речовий доказ... Маю відомості, що в Австралії над словником українських рим працювала поетеса Лідія Далека. І ось тепер, випередивши конкурентів, вийшов третій, офіційний, словник.

Вдумливо й близькуче написав коротеньку передмову до словника Дмитро Павличко. Він "ізсередини", бувши поетом, аналізує творчий процес, слушно розрізняючи в ньому два етапи: "У першому, 'гарячому' і священному періоді, коли відбувається ніби виверження з глибин підсвідомості забутих вражень [...], поет формує лавину почувань і думок словами, що легко приходять, оскільки вони органічно поєднані з його переживаннями. Але творчий процес [...], мабуть, у кожного поета перемежується або завершується 'технічним періодом', коли [...] свідомість аналізує недоліки або достоїнства написаного...."

До статті Павличка надавалися б як епіграф вірші М. Ореста:

... досконалість
Зворотні має, тъмяні, імена:
Біль пориву і праць тугу тривалість ...

Але М. Ореста на Україні невільно згадувати й цитувати навіть Павличкові...

Я додав би до Павличкового переднього слова, що процес **перекладу** поезій, власне, складається лише з одного "технічного періоду", тому брак словника рим особливо давався відсутніми перекладачеві чужомовних поезій.

На добром технічному рівні стоїть "Вступ", що його написав один з упорядників словника Андрій Бурячок. Однак, добачив я в цьому вступі й окремі похибки та недоліки. Серед російських словників не згадано, наприклад, словника рим Лермонтовського "Демона" (такий словник з'явився напередодні війни як журнальна публікація; ні автора, ні видання, на жаль, не пригадую). У назві еспанського словника рим допущено помилку. Стоїть: "Ensaya de un diccionario bable de la rima". Але слова **bable** в еспанській мові не існує. Можливо, там було "doble" — подвійний.

У передмові дано перелік тих поетів, чиї твори послужили джерелом для словника. Із жалем бачимо, що в тому переліку бракує багатьох імен. Перший з-поміж українських поетів, хто буквально бавився римою, нанизуючи дзвінкодзвонні слова часом на шкоду змістові, був Грицько Чупринка, але Чупринку розстріляло чека 1921 р., і тому упорядники словника не мали можливості використати його поетичну спадщину.

Якщо “королем сонета” в українській літературі може бути названий Микола Зеров, то “королем рими” був, безперечно, Євген Плужник. Проте серед поетів, чиї вірші служили базою словника, Плужник не фігурує (так само, до речі, як не фігурує Зеров поміж сонетарів в “антології” “Український сонет”).

Не використано (або не згадано, що використано!) творів таких поетів, як Павло Филипович, Михайло Драй-Хмара, Дмитро Фальківський, Володимир Свідзінський, Леонід Первомайський . . .

Як виходить з переліку, упорядники що близче до сучасності, то більшої переваги надавали ідеологічно-витриманим авторам, щоб не сталося, мовляв, якої диверсії з боку розстріляних чи замучених у карних тaborах поетів . . .

На стор. 10 Бурячок наводить — як буцімто однозгідні — взаємозаперечливі визначення рими, дані різними літературознавцями. Тут і найширше визначення Віктора Жирмунського: рима — “це будь-який звуковий повтор, який виконує організуючу функцію в метричній композиції вірша”. (Зазначу, що під це визначення підходять майже всі явища фоніки. Як виняток можу назвати **лінгограматичний** вірш, де звукова гармонія досягається шляхом уникнення певних звуків.) А побіч стоїть вузьке, неграмотне, призначене хібашо для учнів неповносередньої школи визначення Тимофієва й Тураєва, для яких рима — це “повторення окремих звуків або звукових комплексів, які зв’язують **закінчення** двох чи більше віршів” (підкреслення мое, І.К.). Таке визначення пасує лише для російського народного “вірша”, так званого “райошника”, що є фактично римованою прозою . . .

Скориставшися з нагоди, зазначу, що існує з десяток позицій рими щодо вірша, який вона фонічно оздоблює:

1. Рима початку вірша з його кінцем:

Голе неоране поле . . .
З болем проходжу я полем:
Марно ми Господа молим
І кленемо тебе, доле!

(І.К.)

2. Рима початку вірша з кінцем наступного:

Не вір, вродивко, лісунові:
Не вирій носить він, а вир . . .
(О. Стефанович)

Journal

3. Кінця попереднього вірша з початком наступного:

На зламі двох епох, — в хвості, в болоті,
Щоправда, тяжко скинути **горба**.
Ніяк **гарба** прогресу в рабськім поті
Не зрушить зліднів давнього раба.

(Ів. Багряний)

4. Рима півшів:

Не дві ночі карі очі
любо цілувала . . .
(Шевченко)

5. Рима півшів з кінцем вірша:

Ой ходить **сон** коло вікон;
А дрімота коло **плота**.
(нар. пісня літ. походження)

6. Початки суміжних або близькорозташованих віршів:

Забіліли сніги, забіліли білі,
ще й дібровоночка.
Заболіло тіло, бурлацьке біле,
ще й головоночка . . .
(нар. пісня)

7. Рима суміжних слів у вірші:

Зійшлись, побрались, поєднались . . .
(Шевченко)

8. Суцільна або майже суцільна рима:

Ці небесні самозванці, нечеканці,
Землелюбці, самогубці середанці . . .
(О. Різників)

9. Суцільний монорим. Російський приклад:

Вы слыхали, едва ли слыхали,
Как стенали педали рояли?
(В. Воїнов)

10. Безсистемна внутрішня рима . . .

Тож застосування в науковій передмові льокально-російських визначень і розумінь поезії, поперше, знижує науковість, а подруге, впроваджує елемент русифікації в українське літературознавство. Слід, однак, визнати, що класифікацію рим на сторінках 10-ї та 11-ї дано, сливе, бездоганно: коротко, зрозуміло й вичерпно.

У деяких західноєвропейських словниках римовим таблицям передує цілий трактат з версифікації; так, в еспанському словнику рим, що його

уклав Паскуаль Бльойсе Кампой, під трактат відведено сто двадцять шість сторінок. Упорядники українського словника обмежилися вступом, присвяченим самій тільки римі. І, на мій погляд, це добре: увага читача не розпорошується, не переходить на речі, котрі в данім випадку мають лише побічне значення.

Взагалі, попри названі тут недоліки, "Вступ" Бурячка може правити за відповідний розділ із підручника поетики.

* * *

А тепер — про сам словник.

Еспанська мова (якщо вірити згаданому словникові П. Бльойсе Кампоя) має приблизно шістдесят тисяч рим; у французів (знову ж таки, якщо судити на підставі словника Філіпа Мартіона) набереться лише половина цієї кількості. Але кожен із названих тут словників значно більший від "Словника українських рим" Бурячка й Гурина. Шістдесят тисяч римових одиниць у Бльойсе Кампоя займають 1389 двошпальтових сторінок. У редакційній нотатці до словника Бурячка й Гурина зазначено, що "в ньому представлено шістсот тисяч римованих слів і граматичних форм". Але ці "шістсот тисяч" увібгано, збито, спресовано, мов зеків у столипінському вагоні, у 320 (також двошпальтових) сторінок. Виходить, що кожній римовій одиниці (враховуючи невеличку різницю в форматі) в українському словникові рим мало бути в яких сорок разів тісніше, ніж в еспанському.

Тож якщо б ми повірили редакційній нотатці, текст словника, навіть друкований "діамантом", не міг би вміститися на його сторінках.

Справа в тому, що словник виданий у Радянському Союзі, де жодні цифрові дані принципово не можуть відповідати дійсності і де існує явище, що його звуть ПОКАЗУХА... Якщо ж ми підрахуємо кількість слів на окремих сторінках, а тоді перемножимо на кількість сторінок, то буде вже не шістсот тисяч, а приблизно вчетверо менше... Але й за такої кількості тіснота на сторінках така нездоланна, що віднайти потрібну риму буває не так просто... Не легше, ніж голку в копіці сіна...

Однак, це вада суто технічна: не відпустили паперу, і технічний редактор мусів увібрати колосальний матеріал у невеличку книжку. Значно гірше те, що словник укладено за хибним принципом не звукової подібності слів (як би це мало бути!), а іхньої графічної тотожності. Уявіть-но собі, що цей принцип застосовано до англійської або до російської поезії, де слова, що пишуться по-різному, вимовляються однаково і спокійно між собою римуються. В українській мові таких випадків менше, але вони є.

Насамперед це рими на **и-і**: крім невеликої кількості слів із відкритими наголосеними **и-і** на кінці, усі слова, що мають рими на **и** та на **і**, між собою римуються. (Щоправда, Рильський пробував був римувати також слова з відкритими наголосеними **и-і**, але його приклад не прищепився: Пам'ятаєш високі доми, / Що стояли, як тіні, у тьмі...) Щоб було наочніше, подам кілька прикладів: 1) у окситонній ("чоловічій") римі в закритих

Journal

складах: ходив-спів, мрій-молодий, просинь-осінь, пожаліть-мовчить, днів-ходив, моїх-золотих, сміх-тих; 2) у парокситонній (“жіночій”) римі: світі-блакиті, вітчизну-залізну (усі приклади — зі зб. В. Сосюри “Осінні мелодії”); 3) у пропарокситонній або дактилічній римі: дактилічними-звичними.

Проте упорядники Бурячок і Гурин рими на і та на і дають окремо, так що шукати за кожною римою доводиться двічі: спочатку на “и”, потім на “ї”.

У словнику **вирити** стоїть на сторінці 180, а **вірити** на сторінці 229.

Другий гандж також пов’язаний з графічним принципом упорядкування: це ігнорування авторами того факту, що ненаголошенні та е в римованих клявзулях не порушують римі, а сприймаються на слух як майже точне співзвуччя. Наприклад, на стор. 277 **феномен** стоїть у лівій шпалті, а **комін** і **спомин** — у правій, цілком окремо.

Автори не могли (або не насмілилися!) виділити в окремий ряд рими на г, тож **книга** й **відлига** у них потрапили до тієї самої групи, що й **дзига** та **гирлига**.

Деякі слова дано з неправильним наголосом без позначки, що це діялектина або ж вулична форма.

Маємо:

скраклі
удобин
рапорт

Повинно бути:

скráклі
удовíн
ráпорт

Поважним недоліком здається мені й те, що словник аж ніяк не може претендувати на повноту охоплення матеріялу. На якій би сторінці його не відкрити, відразу впаде в око **відсутність** значної кількості римових рядів, а в рядах наявних — **брак** **багатьох** римі. (На це вже звернув увагу Яр Славутич у рецензії “Перший український римівник”, “Сучасність”, лютий 1981.)

Під час відмінювання слів різних граматичних категорій, завдяки внутрішній флексії, виникають несподівані одноразові співзвуччя. У словнику є, наприклад, ряди: **áван(ъ)** = **áваний** = **áваність** = **áвання**. У кожному ряду бідні (переважно флексивні) рими: **гавань** = **саван**, **удаваний** = **пізнаний** тощо. Але якщо б ми додали кілька рядів, котрих у словнику бракує, то б отримали кілька багатих римів, що їх упорядники не добавили: ряд **аване**: **гаване!** (кличний відм.) = **удаване**; ряд **авані**: **гавані** = (в) **савані** = **удавані**.

Після **ахлий** = **ахля** у словнику йде відразу **ахма**. Але якщо вставити ще **ахлі**, то відразу відкриється багата рима: **кахлі** = **прочахлі**.

Але і в наявних рядах не добачено (чи свідомо не дано) великої кількості слів на ту чи ту риму. Ряд **альп** обмежено до двох слів: **Альп**, **скальп** (та ще для чогось долучено **вальс**, хоч вальс римується з Гальс, а більше, здається, ні з чим). Пропущено натомість **кальп**, від **кальпа** — поняття

індуїстської філософії, що його (поняття) навіть упорядникам римових словників знати аж ніяк би не зашкодило...

На **овен** дано лише дві рими: човен і повен. А де ж Бетховен, гріховен, духовен, суєсловен...? (Архаїзми такого типу залюбки вживали Рильський і Маланюк.) Є крижень = стрижень, але немає крижні = стрижні = тижні = дивовижні = нездвижні. Ряд на **амен** відсутній взагалі (а там би мали стояти слова екзамен, циклямен, латинське **амен**...). В ряді на **амин** знаходимо тільки два слова, **мамин** та **дамин** (третього, "мами", ліпше не рахувати). А от **похрамин** пропущено.

На закінчення дозволю собі продемонструвати, як би мали виглядати римові ряди у словнику, котрий був би упорядкований за фонетичним (а не за графічним) принципом.

Замість окремих коротких, ізольованих відстанню на різних сторінках чи шпалтах рядів, слід би дати у низці випадків довгі, спільні ряди. Наприклад: **ижене = ижени = ижине = ижини = їжене = їжени = їжине = їжини**. І до того приходять рими, що їх бракує в словнику Бурячка й Гурина: **вижене = Ніжине!** (кличн. відм.) = пострижини (поганський ритуал) = розстрижине = ярижине... (присв. прикм.).

"Словник українських рим" може бути в пригоді перекладачеві або версифікаторові аж доти, поки ми не спроможемось видати соліднішу, докладнішу, технічно досконалішу працю з цієї галузі.

Ігор Качуровський, Мюнхен

BOOKS RECEIVED

DARCOVICH, William and Paul YUZYK, eds. *A Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891-1976*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980. xxxiii, 834 pp.

DIMNIK, Martin. *Mikhail, Prince of Chernigov and Grand Prince of Kiev 1224-1246*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1981. xvi, 199 pp.

FARMER, Kenneth C. *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, Symbol and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policy*. The Hague, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980. x, 241 pp.

FR.-CHIROVSKY, Nicholas. *An Introduction to Ukrainian History. Volume 1: Ancient and Kievan-Galician Ukraine-Rus'*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1981. xxiv, 347 pp.

HAY-HOLLOWKO, Oleksa. *Ukrainski pysmennyky v Kanadi: Literaturno-krytychni narysy*, volume 1. Winnipeg: Society of Volyn, 1980. 191 pp.

Informatsiini biuletensi Ukrainskoi hromadskoi hrupy spryannia vykonnanniu Helsinkskykh uhod. Nos. 1-2 (1978), no no. (March 1979), nos. 1-2 (1980). Comp. Osyp Zinkevych, postscript by Nina Strokata. Toronto and Baltimore: V. Symonenko Smoloskyp Publishers, 1981. 199 pp.

KARAVANSKY, Sviatoslav. *Moie remeslo: poezii*. London: Ukrainian Publishers Ltd., 1981. 184 pp.

KHOLODNY, Mykola. *Pro dushu v pisni ta pro pisniu v dashi*. Toronto and Baltimore: V. Symonenko Smoloskyp Publishers, 1981. 139 pp.

Mykola Khvylov. Tvory v p'iatokh tomakh, vol. 2. Comp., ed. and annot. by Hryhory Kostiuk. Intro. by Myroslav Shkandrij. New York, Baltimore and Toronto: V. Symonenko Smoloskyp Publishers and Ukrainian Writers' Association in Exile, 1980. 409 pp.

PARKER, Fan and Stephen Jan PARKER. *Russia on Canvas: Ilya Repin*. University Park, Pa. and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980. xiii, 178 pp.

Christian Rakovsky: Selected Writings on Opposition in the USSR 1923-30. Ed. and with an intro. by Gus Fagan. London and New York: Allison and Busby, 1980. 189 pp.

- RUDENKO, Mykola. *Na dni morskomu : trahediia*. Reprint from *samvydav*. Toronto and Baltimore: V. Symonenko Smoloskyp Publishers, 1981. 74 pp.
- SMOLII, Ivan. *Nespokiina osin*. N.p.: Suchasnist, 1981. 376 pp.
- SUBTELNY, Orest. *The Mazepists : Ukrainian Separatism in the Early Eighteenth Century*. Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs, 1981. Dist. Columbia University Press. 280 pp.
- TARNAVSKY, Rev. Fylymon. *Spohady : Rodynna khronika Tarnavskykh iak prychynok do istorii tserkovnykh, sviashchenytskykh, pobutovykh, ekonomichnykh i politychnykh vidnosyn u Halychyni v druhii polovyni XIX storichchchia i v pershii dekadi XX storichchchia*. Ed. Anatol Mariia Bazylevych and Roman Ivan Danylevych. Toronto: Dobra Knyzhka, 1981. 266 pp.
- WARD, Charles, Philip SHASHKO and Donald E. PIENKOS, eds. *Studies in Ethnicity : The East European Experience in America*. Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs, 1980. Dist. Columbia University Press. viii, 256 pp.

Journal

PUBLICATIONS THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES

Social Sciences

1. Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, 1980. 365 pp.
Cloth \$14.95 Paper \$9.95
2. Jurij Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917-1923: The Communist Doctrine and Practice of National Self-Determination*, 1980. 488 pp.
Cloth \$19.95 Paper \$12.95
3. Volodymyr Vynnychenko: *Shchodennyk* (Diary). Edited, annotated and with an introduction by Hryhory Kostiuk, 1980. 500 pp.
In Ukrainian.
Cloth only \$30.00
4. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, 1981. 269 pp.
Cloth \$14.95 Paper \$9.95

Please order from the *University of Toronto Press, 5201 Dufferin Street, Downsview, Ontario, Canada, M3H 5T8*. Cheques should be payable to University of Toronto Press.

Ukrainian Literature

1. Mykola Zerov, *Lektsii z istorii ukrainskoi literatury* (Lectures on the History of Ukrainian Literature), 1977. 271 pp. *In Ukrainian.*
Cloth \$9.95 Payer \$3.95
2. *Vaplitianskyi zbirnyk* (The VAPLITE Collection). Edited and with an introduction by George S. N. Luckyj, 1977. 260 pp. *In Ukrainian.*
Cloth \$10.95 Paper \$4.95
3. *Antolohiia ukrainskoi liryky, chastyna 1 — do 1919 r.* (An Anthology of Ukrainian Lyric Poetry, Part 1 — To 1919). Edited and with an introduction by Orest Zilinsky, 1978. 439 pp. *In Ukrainian.*
Cloth \$13.95 Paper \$6.95

4. *Ukrainian Demy: Editio Minor*. Translated by George Tarnawsky and Patricia Kilina; introduction by N. K. Moyle, 1979. 219 pp. Published jointly with the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.

Cloth \$9.95 Paper \$5.95

5. *Shevchenko and the Critics, 1861-1980*. Edited by George S. N. Luckyj; introduction by Bohdan Rubchak, 1980. 520 pp. Published for the CIUS by the University of Toronto Press.

Cloth \$30.00 Paper \$8.50

Please order the above books from the *University of Toronto Press*.

6. Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky, *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors*. Translated by Marco Carynyk; with notes and an essay by Bohdan Rubchak, 1981. 127 pp. Published for the CIUS by Ukrainian Academic Press.

Cloth U.S.\$14.50 Paper U.S.\$9.50

Please order from *Ukrainian Academic Press, P.O. Box 263, Littleton, CO 80160, USA*.

Ukrainian Language

1. Assya Humesky, *Modern Ukrainian*, 1980. 438 pp. Paper only \$8.00.
Please order from the *University of Toronto Press*.

2. George Y. Shevelov, *A Historical Phonology of the Ukrainian Language*, 1979. vi, 809 pp. Published for the CIUS by Carl Winter Universitätsverlag.

Cloth 500 Dm Paper 460 Dm

Please order the above book from *Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Postfach 10 61 40, 6900 Heidelberg 1, West Germany*.

3. *Ukrainian-English Dictionary*. Compiled by C. H. Andrusyshen and J. N. Krett. Published for the University of Saskatchewan by the University of Toronto Press; reprinted with the assistance of the CIUS, 1981. xxix, 1,163 pp.

Paper only \$19.95

Please order the above book from the *University of Toronto Press*.

Journal

Ukrainian-Canadian Studies

1. Frances Swyripa, *Ukrainian Canadians: A Survey of Their Portrayal in English-Language Works*, 1978. 169 pp. Published for the CIUS by the University of Alberta Press.

Cloth \$9.95 Paper \$3.95

2. Manoly R. Lupul, ed., *Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism and Separatism: An Assessment*, 1978. 177 pp. Published for the CIUS by the University of Alberta Press.

Paper only \$4.95

Please order the above two books from the *University of Alberta Press*,
450 Athabasca Hall, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, T6G 2E8.

3. W. Roman Petryshyn, ed., *Changing Realities: Social Trends among Ukrainian Canadians*, 1980. 249 pp.

Paper only \$7.95

4. William A. Czumer, *Recollections about the Life of the First Ukrainian Settlers in Canada*. Translated by Louis L. Laychuk; introduction by Manoly R. Lupul, 1980. xvi, 176 pp.

Cloth \$9.95 Paper \$5.95

5. Wsevolod W. Isajiw, ed., *Ukrainians in the Canadian City*. A special issue of the journal *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 1980. ix, 138 pp. Published for the CIUS.

Paper only \$3.00

Please order the above three books from the *University of Toronto Press*.



TO THOSE WISHING TO SUBMIT MANUSCRIPTS

All submissions must be typed on 8½ x 11 inch paper and double-spaced throughout. Footnotes should be placed at the end of the manuscript. Block quotations and four or more lines of verse from Ukrainian should appear in the original. Otherwise the modified Library of Congress system of cyrillic transliteration should be used.

In general, articles should not exceed 25 double-spaced pages, except where especially justified by extensive documentation, tables, or charts. For purposes of style and footnoting, the University of Chicago Press *Manual of Style* should be consulted. Authors should send a short academic biography with their submissions. Manuscripts will not be returned unless specifically requested and postage provided. The policy of the *Journal* is not to consider articles that have been published or are being considered for publication elsewhere. The editors reserve the right to edit all submissions.

A TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION

(Modified Library of Congress)

а	—	a	ї	—	i	ф	—	f
б	—	b	й	—	i	х	—	kh
в	—	v	к	—	k	ц	—	ts
г	—	h	л	—	l	ч	—	ch
ґ	—	g	м	—	m	ш	—	sh
д	—	d	н	—	n	щ	—	shch
е	—	e	օ	—	o	յօ	—	iu
є	—	ie	պ	—	p	յ	—	ia
ж	—	zh	ր	—	r	ь	—	-
з	—	z	ս	—	s	·ի՞յ	—	y in endings
и	—	y	տ	—	t			of personal
і	—	i	յ	—	u			names only

